крым

Consolidated report

based on the results of a
comprehensive
sociological study

Cognitive deoccupation of
Crimea

The research was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) at the
request of the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine and the Mission of the President of
Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as part of the support for the work of the
Council on Cognitive De-occupation of Crimea
September 2024
3
Contents
Glossary 6
Research Methodology 7
Summary 10
Ethnic structure and ideological orientation of Crimean residents 10
The current situation in Crimea 11
Reintegration 12
Collaborationism 15
Memorialisation 16
Potential conflicts after de-occupation 16
1. Self-identification and national-territorial identity. Associations with Crimea. 18
1.1. Residents of the mainland part of Ukraine 18
1.2. Residents of Crimea 20
1.2.1. Crimean Tatars 24
1.2.2. Ukrainians 25
1.2.3. Russians 25
1.3. Crimean Tatars living outside Crimea 26
1.4. Associations with Crimea 28
1.4.1 Associations with Crimea: residents of the mainland part of Ukraine who are not
Crimean Tatars 28
1.4.2 Associations with Crimea: Crimean Tatars in the mainland part of Ukraine 29
1.4.3 Associations with Crimea: residents of Crimea 30
2. Current situation in Crimea 33
2.1. Changes in Crimea over the past ten years 33
2.1.1. Migration 33
2.1.3. Welfare of the population 35
2.1.4. State of infrastructure and environment 36
2.1.5. Employment in Crimea 37
2.1.6. Ideological Influence of Russia 38
2.1.7. Repression of Dissidents 40
2.1.8. Values and Worldview changes amongst Crimean residents 41
2.1.9. Situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea 42
2.1.10. Impact of the full-scale invasion 45
2.2. Awareness of the current situation in Crimea and the mainland part of Ukraine 46
4
2.2.1. Self-assessment of awareness amongst residents of the mainland part of Ukraine,
sources of information and media coverage of the situation in Crimea 46
2.2.2. Awareness of Crimean residents about the situation in the mainland part of
Ukraine 53
3. Civic engagement and social cohesion 56
3.1. Social cohesion of residents of the mainland part of Ukraine 56
3.2. Social cohesion and civic engagement of Crimean residents 57
3.3. Attitudes of residents of Crimea and the mainland part of Ukraine towards each other
61
3.3.1. Situation of Crimean Tatars in mainland Ukraine 61
3.3.2. Attitudes of the mainland part of Ukraine residents towards Crimean residents 62
3.3.2. Attitudes of Crimean residents towards the residents of the mainland part of
Ukraine 65
3.4. Factors of unification between the mainland part of Ukraine and Crimea 67
4. Reintegration of Crimea 71
4.1 Current perception of the situation in Crimea by residents of the mainland part of
Ukraine 71
4.2. Perceptions of the future of Crimea 71
4.2.1. Importance and possibility of de-occupation of Crimea 71
4.2.2. Political and administrative status of Crimea and Sevastopol after de-occupation
73
4.2.3. Economic and infrastructural future of Crimea 76
4.2.4. Demographic Future of Crimea 77
4.2.5. How the future of Crimea is covered in Telegram channels on the peninsula 77
4.3. Structure and organisation of power in a de-occupied Crimea 77
4.3.1 Organisation of Community Governance and Elections after De-occupation 79
4.3.2. Restrictions on the voting rights of citizens living in the occupied territories 80
4.3.3 Quotas in government for Crimean Tatars 80
4.4. Collaborationism 81
4.4.1 Lack of clear policy and communication on collaborationism 81
4.4.2 Is it collaboration if a Crimean resident receives a Russian passport? 86
4.4.3. Who should be punished for collaboration in Crimea 87
4.5. Educational Reintegration 91
4.5.1. Relevance of the education issue 91
4.5.2. Ideological influence of the educational process after the occupation 92
4.5.3. Cultural Diffusion and Blurring of Identity in Crimean Education 93
4.5.4. Language issue in education in Crimea 93
5
4.5.5. Personnel issues in education after de-occupation 95
4.6. Other components of reintegration 95
4.6.1. Demographic and statistical accounting of the existing population of Crimea after
de-occupation 95
4.6.2. Keeping the Crimean issue in the mainland part of Ukraine current 95
4.6.3. Communication of the reintegration plan to the population of Crimea 97
4.7. Challenges that Ukrainian society may face after the de-occupation of Crimea 97
4.7.1. Possible conflict over the status of Crimea and the issue of national-territorial
autonomy of Crimean Tatars 97
4.7.2. Possible social and political conflict between Ukrainian citizens inside Crimea 99
4.7.3. Possible conflict between citizens of the Russian Federation who illegally settled
in Crimea after 2014 and Ukrainian society 100
4.7.4. Possible conflict between Crimean residents and government officials from other
regions of Ukraine 101
4.7.5. Possible tension on the issue of confessions 101
4.7.6. Possible tension in the language issue 102
5. Memory 106
5.1. Attitudes towards monuments and memorials erected during the Russian occupation
of Crimea 106
5.1.1. Division of monuments into groups: historically significant and propaganda 106
5.1.2. Museum of the Occupation 110
5.1.3. Local community decisions vs mandatory implementation of the current laws of
Ukraine 110
5.2. Attitudes towards place names 112
5.3. Attitudes towards war graves 115
6
Glossary
AFU Armed Forces of Ukraine
ARC Autonomous Republic of Crimea
CATI Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews
FSB Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IPSO Information and Psychological Operations
IRI International Republican Institute
KGB Committee for State Security (Predecessor to the FSB)
KIIS Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
NDI National Democratic Institute
SMO Special Military Operation (the Russian designation for Russia’s fullscale war against Ukraine)
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
VPN Virtual Private Network (a virtual private network for anonymisation and
bypassing blocked sites on the Internet)
7
Research Methodology
The research methodology aimed at studying the issues of social cohesion and
challenges related to the de-occupation of Crimea included different approaches,
including qualitative and quantitative data collection methods, which allowed for the
coverage of a wide range of topics and opinions.
The qualitative research was based on focus group discussions and in-depth
interviews. Two focus groups were organised with Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine,
divided by age: young people (18-35) and older participants (50+ years old). This
allowed us to study the differences in attitudes of different generations of Crimean
Tatars towards identity and reintegration. In addition, nine focus groups were
conducted with residents of various regions of Ukraine - Kyiv, the South, the West and
the East - and different age groups (16-24, 25-45, 46+ years). This allowed us to gain
a deeper understanding of Ukrainians' attitudes towards such essential issues as
social cohesion, language policy, decommunisation, monuments, and the prospects
for the reintegration of Crimea. All focus groups were conducted online using the Zoom
platform, which allowed us to engage participants from different parts of the country.
Discussions were recorded for further analysis.
In-depth interviews complemented the qualitative part of the study, providing
an individualised view of the problems of occupation and de-occupation. Six in-depth
interviews were conducted with Crimean residents, three men and three women of
different ages. This gave us various personal stories and visions of the peninsula's
future after de-occupation. An essential part of the study was nine interviews with
experts. These interviews aimed to analyse specific reintegration aspects: legal issues,
education, cultural policy, language issues, memorialisation, and social cohesion.
Experts expressed their opinions on how the reintegration process should occur, what
challenges may arise, and how best to address them. Key topics included discussions
of the role of local communities in decision-making, particularly regarding monuments,
as well as issues related to Crimean Tatar identity and language.
The quantitative study consisted of an all-Ukrainian survey, ‘Cognitive Deoccupation of Crimea’, conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. The
purpose of this survey was to study the opinions of the adult population of Ukraine on
crucial issues related to the reintegration of Crimea and overcoming possible conflict
situations after de-occupation. The survey was conducted using computer-assisted
telephone interviews (CATI), using a specially designed questionnaire programme
based on the SNA software. Mobile numbers for the survey were randomly generated
to ensure a representative sample, and only respondents residing in the governmentcontrolled area participated in the survey. This excluded respondents who moved
abroad after the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The survey was conducted in
Ukrainian or Russian, depending on the respondent's choice. A total of 2014 interviews
were conducted as part of the study.
8
To ensure representativeness, the sample was weighted according to the
gender and age structure of the Ukrainian population, level of education, and region of
residence. The data were compared with official statistics and previous KIIS surveys.
After conducting the planned number of effective (full) interviews, the distribution of
respondents in the sample by macro-region of residence, type of settlement (urban or
rural), gender, age, and education were compared with official statistics. During the
interview, respondents reported their residence until 24 February 2022, and their
current (at the time of interview) place of residence. For further procedures, we used
the place of residence before 24 February 2022. The distribution of the total adult
population by macro-region and settlement type was determined based on data from
the Central Election Commission based on the results of the 2019 parliamentary
elections (by the number of registered voters). The gender and age structure was
determined according to the State Statistics Service as of 1 January 2021. Education
was determined based on the results of KIIS surveys. To bring the sample structure in
line with the structure of the population of Ukraine as a whole, special statistical weights
were constructed. In addition, these weights take into account the different probabilities
of different respondents being included in the sample (depending on the number of
other mobile numbers that a particular respondent has).
The survey covered topics such as attitudes towards decommunisation, the
future of monuments, language policy, social cohesion, and the role of local
communities in reintegration.
An analysis of the content of Telegram channels was used to study the
information space of Crimea and Ukraine regarding reintegration issues. For this
purpose, we used the automated data collection system Semantrum, which allowed us
to collect a large amount of textual data from publications, comments and reactions in
Telegram channels related to Crimea (30,000 publications were analysed at the first
stage). In the second stage, 500 of the most active Crimean channels were selected,
where topics related to the peninsula's status, national issues, memorialisation,
education, and militarisation were discussed. The content analysis of the data included
identifying key issues and analysing specific keywords and phrases, which made it
possible to trace the prevailing sentiments in these channels.
The content analysis was conducted in two stages. First, a textual analysis was
performed to identify the main topics most frequently discussed in the Telegram
channels of Crimea, which allowed us to create a general picture of information
priorities in Crimea. In the second stage, a more detailed analysis was conducted
based on key topics and words, which allowed us to understand how Crimeans discuss
de-occupation, their sentiments towards Ukraine, and what issues are of the most
significant concern to the peninsula's residents. This stage helped to study not only the
official position but also the attitudes of ordinary citizens of Crimea and Ukraine.
The analysis of the content of Ukrainian Telegram channels aimed to study the
information space, including publications, comments and reactions related to the topic
9
of Crimea. The data were collected automatically using the Semantrum system, which
allowed us to track the activity of more than 1,000 Ukrainian channels between
February 1 and July 31, 2024. The main topics were the status of Crimea, education,
national issues, memorialisation, and militarisation. The content analysis allowed us to
identify key trends in public discussions and prevailing sentiments regarding the deoccupation and reintegration of the peninsula.
Data collection for this study lasted from 31 July to 9 August 2024, for the
qualitative stages, and the quantitative survey lasted from 26 July to 12 August 2024.
The analysis of the content of Telegram channels covered the period from 1 February
to 31 July 2024.
Thus, thanks to a comprehensive approach that included focus groups, in-depth
interviews, a quantitative survey, and media monitoring, we acquired a detailed picture
of Ukrainian society's attitude to the de-occupation of Crimea and identified the main
challenges associated with the peninsula's reintegration.
10
Summary
Ethnic structure and ideological orientation of Crimean
residents
Creating a realistic concept and plan for the de-occupation of Crimea requires
an understanding of the current demographic structure of the peninsula, as well as the
changes that have occurred since 2014. It is important to objectively analyse the ethnic
and ideological structure of the population living there today and to predict the reactions
of these segments to possible decisions that will be made after de-occupation.
Belonging to ethnic and ideological groups on the peninsula determines attitudes
towards vital political issues: the de-occupation process, the status of Crimea after deoccupation, as well as possible decisions on toponymy, memorialisation, etc.
Currently, there is no single ethnic and civic identity for Crimean residents: the
peninsula is home to many ethnic groups, the most numerous of which are Russians,
Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars. Within each ethnic group, there are ideological and
social differences due to political views (pro-Ukrainian, pro-Russian, indifferent), place
of residence (South Coast, Sevastopol, steppe Crimea), length of residence on the
peninsula, source of income, social status, lifestyle, experience of deportation, etc.
Crimean Tatars (on mainland Ukraine and in Crimea) are characterised by a strong
sense of belonging to their ethnic group and the peninsula and a widespread
perception of themselves as part of the Ukrainian political nation. In contrast,
Ukrainians in Crimea, according to experts, have had few opportunities to strengthen
their Ukrainian identity, ethnic and civic. One peculiarity of Crimean residents is that
many have a regional, ‘island’ identity, perceiving themselves as ‘Crimeans’ as
opposed to self-determination by ethnicity or citizenship.
After the Russian temporary occupation of Crimea in 2014, the ethnic structure
of the population underwent significant changes: some residents left the peninsula for
various reasons, but at the same time, there was a large-scale resettlement from
Russia's territory and, after 2022, from the temporarily occupied territories of south
Ukraine. Different experts estimate the number of newcomers at an average of around
1 million people.
Changes in the demographic structure of the population, as well as the
processes of ideological indoctrination and cultural diffusion taking place in Crimea,
shape the identity, moods, expectations, fears, and inclinations of the peninsula's
residents, directly affecting the reintegration process. Experts suggest that the deoccupation of Crimea itself will cause significant demographic changes. It is expected
that some of the Russians who settled in Crimea after 2014 may leave the peninsula,
and possible economic and infrastructure problems may force young people to
emigrate, including outside of Ukraine. Another component of demographic changes
will be the deployment of specialists from different regions of Ukraine to Crimea to work
11
on the reintegration of the peninsula. Possible scenarios of drastic demographic
changes should be analysed in advance.
The current situation in Crimea
Both Crimean residents and experts mentioned both positive and negative
changes that have taken place on the peninsula during the ten years of Russian
occupation. Both groups acknowledge that Russia has invested a lot of money to
improve the welfare of the population on the peninsula, especially in the first years after
the attempted annexation: in particular, it has increased wages and pensions,
introduced certain social benefits, repaired and built new infrastructure, and introduced
enhanced measures to ensure public safety. It was mentioned that the labour market
in Crimea is full of vacancies, including high-paying ones.
On the other hand, the positive changes have a flip side: the improvement in the
personal well-being of the population was more noticeable in the first years of the
temporary occupation, after which it came to nought for many. Freedom of enterprise
has deteriorated: small entrepreneurs are often forced to cooperate with large
businesses associated with the state on unfavourable terms. The construction of new
infrastructure sometimes harms the environment. Some residents feel unsafe because
of the many newcomers and their antisocial behaviour.
The Russian occupation administration conducts intensive propaganda work on
the peninsula, backing up ideological influence with repressive pressure on those who
do not demonstrate loyalty. As a result, the population of Crimea is mostly focused on
personal safety, and it is atomised and passive. After the full-scale invasion, the
ideological and repressive pressure intensified further.
The situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea has become more complicated since
Russia occupied the peninsula. On the one hand, the Russian occupation
administration declares peace and friendship between peoples and takes
demonstrative steps to show their attention to the needs of Crimean Tatars. On the
other hand, it is trying to blur their ethnic identity and increase their loyalty to Russia,
including through interference in religious institutions. Those Crimean Tatars who
demonstrate disloyalty are subject to repression.
All components of the study show a lack of information about Crimea in the
Ukrainian information space, and the level of awareness of mainland Ukrainians
(including Crimean Tatars) about the peninsula is low (according to their assessment).
In addition to the explanations offered by ordinary respondents, which are likely to be
true - independent media have limited access to the peninsula, and the local population
is reluctant to share information for fear of reprisal - experts also offer another
interpretation: there is no active policy on the de-occupation of Crimea, and therefore
the number of newsworthy events remains very small. Representatives of the Crimean
Tatars, who are better informed about the situation in Crimea, also pointed to the
12
sometimes unprofessional work of Ukrainian media in matters related to the peninsula
and specifically the Crimean Tatars.
Reintegration
The issue of Crimea's status after de-occupation – whether it will receive
autonomy as before 2014, acquire Crimean Tatar national-territorial autonomy, or
become an ordinary region - has not yet been discussed at a high political level. At the
same time, according to experts, this issue has significant conflict potential. Currently,
Ukrainian society does not have a generally accepted vision of a solution regarding the
future status of Crimea in Ukraine. Amongst citizens of mainland Ukraine, Crimean
Tatar national autonomy is the least popular of the three options, and awareness of
this option remains low. Although most citizens do not oppose this idea when asked
directly, the validity of such answers needs to be analysed, as respondents indicate
that they have little knowledge of the concept. At the same time, the Crimean Tatar
community and the experts who represent it are almost wholly consolidated around
national-territorial autonomy. Many other experts support this proposal, whilst others
see risks in it.
Generally, most Ukrainians (77.5% – 96.0%) have a good or at least neutral
attitude towards IDPs, refugees abroad, Ukrainians under occupation, and Russianspeaking citizens. However, there is still a differentiation in attitudes and somewhat
better attitudes are observed in the cases of Crimean residents who moved to
government-controlled territories after the full-scale invasion, IDPs, Crimean Tatars,
and Ukrainians in the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and
Kharkiv Oblasts: at least 63% have a favourable attitude towards them (and a
significant number are neutral). At the same time, in the case of refugees abroad,
Russian-speaking citizens, and Ukrainians under occupation in Crimea and Donbas
neutral attitudes prevail: only about a third have a good attitude; while 43-47% have a
neutral attitude. In addition to a direct question about attitudes towards specific
categories, the survey also examined attitudes towards Ukrainians living under
occupation using the Bogardus scale (adapted)1
. Since 1994, KIIS has been
researching the attitudes of the Ukrainian population towards certain ethnic groups.
This research is based on the scale developed by the American sociologist Emory
Bogardus (adapted by N. Panina). For each ethnic group (or group formed on other
grounds) from the list, respondents have to answer how close they are willing to be
with representatives of each group. This is called social distance. The minimum social
distance is 1 (I agree to let them in as a family member), and the maximum is 7 (I would
not let them into Ukraine). The level of social distance is often interpreted as prejudice
1 More information about the Bogardus scale can be found in this publication. Gorbachyk, O. (2005).
Testing the Validity of the Bogardus Scale for Measuring Interethnic Tolerance in Ukraine. Scientific
notes of NaUKMA. Volume 46. Sociological sciences.
https://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/server/api/core/bitstreams/2caf07c7-47fd-44dc-9436-
17df422e4e19/content
13
against a particular group. In the case of all three groups of the population - Ukrainians
living under occupation in Crimea / in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts / in Zaporizhzhia,
Kharkiv, and Kherson Oblasts - the average value ranges from 2.8 to 3.4 (where 1 is
the most open/tolerant attitude, and 7 is the most hostile attitude). This indicates a
relatively low distance to all groups. Respondents are ‘closest’ to residents of
Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Kherson Oblasts (2.8). This is followed by the residents of
Crimea (3.1), and the relatively lowest indicator is for the residents of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts (3.4).
Regarding Crimea's resistance to the occupation over the past ten years, 43.2%
of respondents agree that ‘the population of Crimea has been resisting the Russian
occupation for all ten years’; 48.7% disagree.
The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians reject the idea of the peninsula's
Russian past. Most respondents believe that Crimea should return to Ukrainian control
and recognise Crimea as the homeland of the Crimean Tatar people. At the same time,
opinions on the role of the Crimean Khanate in Ukrainian statehood are divided: the
majority (59%) of respondents agree that the Crimean Khanate is part of the history of
the formation of Ukrainian statehood, although 28% disagree.
Although most Ukrainians support the return of Crimea to Ukrainian control, only
a little more than half consider it very important to them personally. The majority agree
that significant financial support and benefits for businesses will be necessary after the
de-occupation of the peninsula. Less than half of the respondents believe in the deoccupation of Crimea within the next five years, with young people being less optimistic
in the short term than older people and the de-occupation of the peninsula itself being
less important to them.
Experts emphasise that the Ukrainian authorities should be organisationally,
methodologically, and legally prepared to govern Crimea on the ground right now
rather than addressing this issue after de-occupation. Most Ukrainians support the
introduction of quotas for the Crimean Tatar people in the local governments of Crimea
and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The respondents were almost equally divided on
the issue of organising community governance in Crimea after de-occupation: 47%
support the holding of elections, whilst the same number of respondents believe that
community leaders should be appointed by the President, the Government or local
military-civilian administrations.
Regarding the timing of the elections for the local authorities of Crimea, almost
half of the respondents believe that the elections should take place after the complete
restoration of the security situation in Crimea. At the same time, a significant number
of respondents are ready for faster elections - immediately after the end of martial law
(19%) or no later than a year after de-occupation (20%). It is essential to develop a
safe format to ensure citizens will express themselves after the de-occupation of
Crimea.
14
The issue of restricting the voting rights of citizens who lived in Crimea under
occupation causes serious divisions in society. Almost half of the respondents support
the five-year restriction on participation in the national elections, whilst the other half
oppose it. Regarding the right to run for President and the Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine,
the majority supports such restrictions, but many respondents oppose them.
Experts and ordinary citizens recognise that education is crucial in Crimea's
reintegration. Most respondents support simplified admission to Ukrainian higher
education institutions for Crimean youth. Education is also one of the central topics of
the Crimean media, where, along with organisational issues, the ideologisation and
militarisation of schooling by the occupation administration are actively discussed.
Experts believe this poses severe challenges for reintegration, as it raises a generation
of students with a negative attitude towards Ukraine.
Experts emphasise the importance of resolving the language issue through
quotas for teaching in indigenous and minority languages but note that this does not
solve the issue of the Russian language in the Crimean educational system, which
requires other approaches.
54% of residents of the mainland part of Ukraine who participated in the
quantitative survey said they did not support the temporary use of Russian for teaching
in educational institutions. However, a reasonably significant number of respondents
(45%) expressed support. Amongst Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, opponents of the
temporary permit significantly prevail (although there are also quite a few who agree).
Amongst bilingual and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, the majority support the
temporary permit.
Regarding the staffing of the educational process in Crimea after de-occupation,
only 22% of respondents insist on the complete replacement of all teachers, heads of
institutions, education officials, etc., who worked during the occupation. Instead, 34%
propose to dismiss only heads of institutions and officials (if they have not committed
crimes), and 40% consider it necessary only to limit the dismissal to officials in the field
of education who have committed crimes.
One of the essential problems raised by respondents is not only the
indoctrination of students in schools on temporarily occupied territories but also the
gradual erosion of cultural identity, in particular amongst Crimean Tatar children
studying in mixed schools. According to them, this leads to children adopting the
majority culture and losing their cultural characteristics. In addition, experts raise the
issue of the recognition of Russian educational documents, especially for those
students who received their education after 2014. It remains unclear which subjects
can be recognised by the Ukrainian state and which will require additional recertification.
Experts emphasise the importance of establishing a system of registration and
documentation of the Crimean population immediately after de-occupation. Ukraine
will be responsible for these people under international humanitarian law.
15
Some experts believe that the issue of de-occupation is not sufficiently present
on the agenda of Ukrainian society. In addition to developing strategies, there should
be ongoing work to demonstrate cultural and political unity with Crimea. It is also
important to update the topic of Crimea in Ukrainian school education, emphasising
forming the proper ideological basis for de-occupation. In addition, the plan for
Crimea's reintegration should be carefully developed and communicated to the
peninsula's residents to avoid distrust and fear amongst Crimeans.
Collaborationism
The issue of collaborationism in Crimea is one of the biggest challenges for the
reintegration of the peninsula, as the lack of a clear approach to its definition and
communication with residents of the temporarily occupied territory raises severe fears
of persecution for themselves and their loved ones. Both experts and ordinary citizens
note that the lack of an unambiguous policy on collaborationism makes the prospects
of de-occupation threatening for many Crimeans, even those who support Ukraine.
Experts recognise that communication efforts to explain this issue have not been
adequately implemented, and the legal definition of collaborationism remains
inconsistent and confusing. There are fears that mistakes in this regard could lead to
new conflicts after de-occupation.
The survey respondents emphasise the importance of an individual approach
to the issue of collaborationism, as rash actions can lay the foundation for new
problems in Crimea. At the same time, it is essential to convey to the peninsula's
residents that they are Ukrainians, not traitors, and to avoid creating the image of a
‘punisher’. Experts warn that the authorities' ill-conceived communication not only
causes anxiety amongst Crimeans but also negatively affects public opinion in Ukraine
about the importance of de-occupying Crimea.
Most Ukrainians believe that Crimean residents who received Russian
passports during the occupation did so by force, without a natural choice. At the same
time, a significant share of people (29%) disagrees with this interpretation.
An essential aspect of the discussion is the distinction between voluntary and
forced collaboration. Experts emphasise that the key is determining whether a person's
activities were politically motivated or if they performed neutral functions, such as those
of a maths teacher or a firefighter. Collaborationism in education is particularly
complicated, where work has social and ideological components.
Regarding punishment for collaboration with the occupation administration,
most Ukrainians support strict measures against officials, judges, security forces, and
media workers. However, in the case of emergency services and public utilities, the
majority opposes punishment. The sphere of education and culture evokes
contradictory opinions: the majority supports punishment for managers and teachers
of humanitarian disciplines, whilst ordinary educators are more lenient. As for
16
entrepreneurs and doctors, many respondents believe they should not be punished,
especially if they are ordinary employees.
Memorialisation
After the de-occupation of Crimea, Ukrainian society will face several challenges
related to monuments, place names, and war graves, and these issues require not only
careful consideration but also the search for compromises. Most respondents favoured
that monuments erected during the occupation should be dismantled, especially those
of a colonial or propagandistic nature. However, it is important to distinguish between
such monuments and those with cultural or historical value, related to the development
of Crimea or the Crimean Tatar people. In this context, society seeks to avoid radical
solutions that could exacerbate conflicts and instead tends to favour a compromise
approach that involves local communities in the decision-making process.
One of the key ideas supported by experts and focus group participants is the
importance of dismantling monuments and creating conditions for these decisions to
be perceived as a natural process. For example, through information campaigns
explaining the historical context and reasons for such actions, initiatives from the
bottom, from the Crimeans themselves, can be perceived much better than those
imposed by the authorities. This will avoid conflicts and help to form a common position
on the peninsula's future.
Society is also seeking a compromise on the issue of place names. Opinions on
radical name changes are divided, with many believing that it is essential to consider
the heritage of all ethnic groups inhabiting Crimea. The overwhelming majority of
respondents favour a gradual transition and the preservation of meaningful names to
local communities, which will avoid conflicts and facilitate the peaceful reintegration of
the peninsula.
The same compromise position is evident in the issue of war graves. Most
respondents and experts believe these places of remembrance should be left, but
memorialisation should be avoided, as it could glorify the aggression. The reburial of
Russian soldiers should only take place at the request of their relatives or the state,
which will allow for compliance with international norms and respect for memory
without risking conflict.
Ukrainian society generally seeks compromise solutions to memory,
decommunisation, and historical heritage issues. It is ready to preserve the memory of
the past but to do so in a way that avoids new conflicts in the future.
Potential conflicts after de-occupation
After the de-occupation of Crimea, Ukrainian society may face many serious
challenges. Experts predict that one of the critical issues will be a political conflict over
17
the model of governance of the peninsula. In particular, the idea of Crimean Tatar
autonomy is not yet widely supported in Ukrainian society, which could lead to tensions
between Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian authorities after the de-occupation.
Ukrainian society's level of knowledge about Crimean Tatar national-territorial
autonomy is still low.
Another threat is a possible conflict between those who remained loyal to
Ukraine and those who supported the occupation. Such fears are expressed not only
by experts but also by Crimean Tatars living in the mainland part of Ukraine. They also
note that some Crimeans who support Russia may create obstacles to reintegration.
The Crimean Tatar respondents fear both direct conflicts and that the pro-Russian
community will try to make Crimea ‘some kind of separate part of Ukraine’.
One of the most challenging issues will be the policy towards Russian citizens
who settled in Crimea after 2014, not all of whom will want to leave voluntarily. Experts
warn that deportation or other radical actions against these people could be considered
a violation of international law. In addition, there will be a legal problem with the
property built after the occupation, which Crimean residents are already using but
which is illegal under Ukrainian law.
Another challenge may be Crimeans’ perception of managers who will be sent
from other regions of Ukraine to restore governance on the peninsula. This may cause
a sense of ‘quasi-colonisation’ amongst the local population.
The church issue could also cause conflicts, as many Crimeans are members
of the Russian Orthodox Church. The language issue is even more sensitive: rapid and
comprehensive Ukrainisation could provoke tensions, whilst most experts and citizens
support a gradual transition to the Ukrainian language in government, education,
media and other areas. Most respondents of the quantitative survey (67% to 76%)
believe that a transition period should be established in Crimea to introduce the
Ukrainian language in certain institutions (government agencies, cultural institutions,
etc.). Support for the Crimean Tatar language is also high amongst Ukrainians,
although not everyone agrees.
Experts emphasise that Ukraine should already develop a strategy for
communication with Crimeans. Without a clear concept and proper communication,
these challenges could increase distrust and create additional difficulties in
reintegrating the peninsula.
18
1. Self-identification and national-territorial
identity. Associations with Crimea.
1.1. Residents of the mainland part of Ukraine
Data from a nationally representative survey show that Ukrainian ethnic selfidentification dominates amongst Ukrainian residents: 92% consider themselves
Ukrainian by ethnic origin. Another 2% simultaneously identify as Ukrainians and
Russians; the same number say they are Russians. Other ethnic groups were
represented by no more than 0.5% of respondents each.
Regarding territorial identity, 75% primarily consider themselves citizens of
Ukraine, another 14% - residents of the settlement or district where they live, and 5%
- residents of the settlement or district where they were born or lived for some time.
Amongst other options: Crimean, a representative of their ethnicity, a citizen of the
former Soviet Union, a citizen of Europe, a citizen of the world - none of them gained
more than 2%. Ukrainian civic identity prevails in all socio-demographic and linguisticethnic groups studied.
Three quarters of Ukrainians (75%) consider Ukrainian their native language.
For a minority, both Ukrainian and Russian (14%) or only Russian (10%) are native
languages. At home, 64% speak Ukrainian predominantly, another 20% speak
19
Ukrainian and Russian approximately equally, and 15% use Russian predominantly.
Thus, Russian remains the language of choice for about a third of Ukrainians at home.
If we combine respondents' answers regarding ethnic self-identification and
preferred language of communication, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians are the most
numerous amongst the linguistic and ethnic categories (61%). This is followed by
Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian and Russian equally (18%) and Russian-speaking
Ukrainians (12%). The share of Russian-speaking Russians is 1%. In the East, South,
and Kyiv, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians make up slightly less than half of the
population, but together with bilingual Ukrainians, they constitute the majority.
The results of this and previous nationwide sociological surveys compare and
indicate that the full-scale invasion has strengthened Ukrainian civic and ethnic identity
and influenced the use of the Ukrainian language in communication.
Ethnic self-identification has undergone significant changes after 2014 and
especially after 2022. This is partly due to the occupation of the territories where many
20
representatives of the Russian ethnic group lived, but changes have also occurred in
the minds of citizens. Previous studies show that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, up
to a quarter of Ukrainians considered themselves Ukrainians and Russians at the same
time, and this phenomenon, although more common in the South and East, was
significantly represented in all regions. In this survey, only 2% of respondents identified
themselves as bi-ethnic.
According to monitoring data from the Institute of Sociology of the National
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in the early 1990s, just under half of respondents
considered themselves primarily Ukrainian citizens. Over the years, the figure grew,
and on the eve of the invasion, it was over 60%. As noted above, it is now up to 75%.
Focus group participants from the mainland part of Ukraine agreed that Russian
aggression has made them more aware of their ethnicity and nationality and feel proud
of their country:
‘Yes, until 2022, I identified more with Russians
because I was only in their cultural space. But with the
beginning of the full-scale invasion, I started studying
history and better understood who I am. And so, I started to
identify myself as Ukrainian.’ (focus group with nonCrimean Tatar residents of Ukraine)
1.2. Residents of Crimea
Crimea's residents are not homogeneous; several groups with different
ethnicities, self-perceptions, and worldviews represent them.
Regarding ethnicity, there are three most prominent groups: Ukrainians,
Russians, and representatives of indigenous peoples (Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and
Krymchaks), amongst whom the Crimean Tatars dominate. According to a poll
conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in May 20132
, 59% of
respondents identified themselves by ethnicity as Russians, 20% as Ukrainians, 15%
as Crimean Tatars, and 6% as representatives of other ethnic groups. Regarding selfperception (regardless of citizenship), 40% of Crimean residents considered
themselves Russians, 15% - Ukrainians, 15% - Crimean Tatars, and 24% - Crimeans.
Amongst the ethnic Crimean Tatars surveyed, 100% identified themselves accordingly.
Amongst ethnic Ukrainians, 66% considered themselves Ukrainians, 19% - Crimeans,
10% - Russians, and 5% - someone else. Amongst ethnic Russians, 63% considered
themselves Russians, 29% Crimeans, 3% Ukrainians, and 4% - someone else.
2 Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. May 16 – 30, 2013.
https://www.iri.org/wpcontent/uploads/legacy/iri.org/2013%20October%207%20Survey%20of%20Crimean%20Public%20O
pinion,%20May%2016-30,%202013.pdf
21
After the Russian occupation, the ethnic structure of the population became
even more heterogeneous. Some residents left the peninsula for various reasons, but
at the same time, there was a large-scale resettlement from Russia and also from the
occupied South of Ukraine after 2022. Different experts estimate the number of
newcomers at an average of roughly 1 million people.
‘Russia has been pursuing its colonising policy with
great power and financial support from the very first days,
through resettlement, changing the structure of the
population, the ethnic structure. According to various
estimates, they achieved this with 750 thousand to 1.2
million people. This structure is now changing even more
because IDPs from the South, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia
Oblasts are settling there and receiving housing certificates.
There are family members of soldiers who were redeployed
to Crimea, and Crimea is now a transit zone’. (expert
interview)
Experts confirm the absence of a single identity for Crimean residents:
‘We cannot talk about the identity of Crimean
residents because there are several identities in Crimea. The
identity of Crimean Tatars will be one identity, the identity of
Russians in Crimea will be another identity, whilst
Ukrainians are yet another identity. And here we can, if we
generalise, talk about the inhabitants of Crimea today, about
a social environment with a lot of mistrust and fear. This
relates to the temporary occupation of Crimea. That is why
today, this is one of the key questions regarding where
Ukrainians and Crimean residents position themselves and
how they feel. I would divide the residents of Crimea into
pro-Ukrainian, pro-Russian, and those who are like
weathervanes, ready to adjust to the order in either way.’
(expert interview)
Even within one ethnic group, there are differences. For example, Crimean
Tatars were scattered in different countries before returning from deportation, which
affected their experience in Crimea. There is also a difference in social status and
lifestyle: for example, residents of the southern coast of Crimea, whose significant
source of income is tourism and resort recreation, differ from residents of the steppe
of the peninsula, whilst residents of Sevastopol feel separate from other Crimeans.
‘You know, Crimea is very diverse. It's not just
Crimean residents; it's several ethnic and political groups
whose social status matters. And you understand that the
22
mentality of the family members of a Russian retired officer
from the Soviet Union period is very different. And he moved
to Crimea to live, right? It's very different to a typical
Crimean family. Ukrainians who were resettled from
Western Ukraine, there are whole villages in embroidered
towels, you know? And Ukrainian folklore ensembles. This
is a very diverse Crimea. And the South Coast is one group
of people. People who are used to earning money during the
season and then spending it. These are very entrepreneurial
people with completely different behaviours, and I would
say, lifestyles and ways of life than people in the steppe of
Crimea or in the foothills. [...] Another group are the Crimean
Tatars. And here, in general, it is tough to speak briefly and
unequivocally because of the process of return, that is, after
living half a century in special settlements and places of
deportation, living in different countries, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, North Asia, it is not the same, believe me, not at
all.’ (expert interview)
As noted above, another approach categorises Crimean residents based on
their political views: pro-Russian, pro-Ukrainian, or indifferent. Experts note that
political orientation overlaps but does not entirely coincide with ethnicity. Ukrainians
and Crimean Tatars dominate the pro-Ukrainian community of Crimeans. Russians
dominate the pro-Russian community, but there are also representatives of other
ethnic groups. One expert shared the observation that at the beginning of the
occupation, young people in Crimea were more pro-Ukrainian than the older
generation.
The interviewed experts stated that indifferentism is widespread amongst the
peninsula's residents. One manifestation is an instrumental attitude to Ukrainian
citizenship, which provides specific opportunities abroad.
‘...the majority - I call them a swamp. That is, those
who don't care about the Russian flag or the Ukrainian flag,
the Russian government or the Ukrainian government, who
don't care. The main thing is that they have water, income,
money, a pension, and so on.’ (expert interview)
‘I don't think they generally associate themselves with
anyone regarding their country. If you ask them, probably
many of them will say that they live in Russia because
Crimea is Russian, conditionally, and they don't think about
it. But when they go on holiday abroad, they will gladly take
a Ukrainian passport just as they will use it to get some
23
benefits under Article 24 in Ireland or Germany. And there
are probably a lot of them.’ (expert interview)
Even before the occupation, many Crimean residents were characterised by a
regional, ‘island’ identity: perceiving themselves as ‘Crimeans’ as opposed to selfdetermination by ethnicity or citizenship. Russia has further fuelled this identity,
attempting to weaken the sense of belonging to Ukrainian society and state. After the
peninsula's occupation, Russia, on the contrary, made considerable efforts to replace
the ‘island’ identity with the Russian one.
‘Crimeans always think, and this is exactly what the
propaganda campaign was built on, which started
somewhere in 2010, In 2012, it was already very noticeable
in terms of the ‘Russian world’, and in 2014, it was built on
the fact that Crimeans are special. And almost all the
politicians who came to Crimea with their speeches,
Zhirinovsky and others, if you look at them, their main
theses were “You are special, we understand this, and you
belong in the Russian Federation, which will consider your
specialness. It will offer you much more than Ukraine offered
you, which tried to make you the same as everyone else, like
the rest of Ukrainians”. So, I think this should be considered
in the future reintegration.’ (expert interview)
‘Today, the Russian Federation is trying to neutralise
this Crimean identity; it is trying to create an all-Russian, allswamp identity, that it is one swamp. This will be a difficult
situation for Ukraine because it was much easier to work
with a separate identity, let's say, the Crimean identity, than
to work with the Russian identity.’ (expert interview)
Some Crimean participants in the in-depth interviews emphasised their regional
identity and emphasised the differences between Crimeans and Russians:
‘...it's kind of a joke, but for probably ten years or so
now, people have been saying, “Well, we have Crimean
nationality, we are Crimean, so we are somehow...” We still
have a different mentality; we are slightly different to
mainland Russia.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
Like residents of the mainland part of Ukraine, the events of 2014-2022
prompted some Crimeans to rethink their national and ethnic self-identification.
‘...2014 was a great kick in the pant for Crimeans
because before, I lived with the understanding that I was
Russian, Ukrainian, whatever. I mean, it's clear that I'm
Slavic, but until 2014, I was a citizen of Ukraine, so I knew I
24
was a citizen of Ukraine everywhere; I filled in the forms. But
I never thought about my ethnicity until 2014.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents)
1.2.1. Crimean Tatars
According to experts and participants in focus groups and in-depth interviews,
Crimean Tatars are characterised by a strong ethnic identity and a sense of belonging
to the peninsula, which is their homeland. This group cherishes their identity and tries
to preserve it in their children whenever possible, for example, by reviving the use of
the Crimean Tatar language at home.
‘I belong to the Nogai family, and our native lands are
the Crimean steppes. My mother is a Kerch Nogai from the
Kerch side, and my father is from the coast of the Black Sea.
These are also steppes, roughly speaking, it’s just that the
sea comes after the steppe. And naturally, in any case, it's
the region that defines me. Because even if I were to be in
Armenia or Tajikistan, my home is still here.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents, Crimean Tatar)
Experts have repeatedly emphasised that Crimean Tatars generally gravitate
towards Ukraine rather than Russia. One of the reasons is that Russia is perceived as
the successor to the USSR, a country that carried out the deportations and continues
to repress the Crimean Tatar community. Another possible reason for this is the
commitment of Crimean Tatars to the values of freedom and dignity, which they see
as likely to be realised in Ukraine. However, over the past ten years, this community,
especially the youth, has been exposed to Russian influence in one way or another,
which could have affected their worldview.
‘And I'm sure that if you talk to these children, i.e., the
children of Crimean Tatars, they may not remember
anything about Ukraine, but if you ask them, probably they
will associate themselves with Ukraine politically. And if the
security situation allowed, they would say, frankly, many of
them would say that we are pro-Ukrainian, sticking to our
state and our citizenship. But they, many of them, if you
listen to the music that they add to their publications, posts
and other things... Even, I think, in the governmentcontrolled territory, many, many young people are still under
the influence of all the Russian narratives and music.’
(expert interview)
According to experts, some Crimean Tatars are orientated towards Europe.
Some are drawn to countries that follow Islam (for example, Turkey).
25
1.2.2. Ukrainians
Despite their numbers, ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea had few opportunities to
maintain and develop their ethnic identity. According to one expert, before the
occupation, only a few of the more than 200 Crimean schools provided education in
Ukrainian, and only a few cultural and sporting events out of the entire list approved by
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) Supreme Council were dedicated to
Ukrainian historical events and cultural figures (whilst most were about Russian history
and culture).
‘So here are the Ukrainians, there are a lot of our
people there, that’s understandable. But these people are
very inclined to collaborate because they have always felt
like second-class citizens, even during the years of
Ukraine's independence. Because even though it was
Ukraine, the Ukrainian government flirted with the proRussian and Russian majority and abused Ukrainians. Well,
suffice it to say, as my friend, the former head of education
in Crimea and former actress, Alla Petrova, used to say,
there are as many Ukrainians in Crimea as there are children
in Ukrainian classes. And so, this is a problem.’ (expert
interview)
Experts believe that despite the large number of Ukrainians by origin, a strong
ethnic identity was inherent in a relatively small portion of these people.
‘Well, we should not forget about such a small group,
a tiny, numerous small group - those who called themselves
Ukrainians of Crimea or the ethnic Ukrainian community of
Crimea. As you know, they had their media, including the
Krymska Svitlytsia. And in the Krymska Svitlytsia, as I read,
I recently reread the archives of the early 90s, they indicate
that we are very numerous in Crimea. But to be honest, there
were very few who clearly identified themselves and
associated themselves ethnically with Ukrainians. This can
be confirmed, I think, by the very circulation of the Krymska
Svitlytsia, which seems to have been distributed very little
by subscription and also not sold very widely.’ (expert
interview)
1.2.3. Russians
Experts distinguish several waves of migration of ethnic Russians/carriers of
Russian identity and culture to the peninsula. The current ethnocultural portrait of
Crimea was formed under the influence of, amongst others, ‘Soviet retirees’: Soviet
army servicemen, representatives of state institutions, etc., who willingly settled in
26
Crimea. Even after Ukraine declared independence, the Russian military settled there
permanently. After 2014 and 2022, a flow of people from Russia again came to Crimea
to settle on the peninsula. Due to these processes, the share of Russian identity (ethnic
and civic) in Crimea has increased significantly over the past ten years.
‘Crimean identity, in general, is exceptional, even in
peacetime, because historically, Crimea was inhabited
mainly by Russian-speaking or culturally Russian people.
This happened as a result, firstly, of the annexation of
Crimea in 1783, and the second major factor was the
deportation of Crimean Tatars and the representatives of
other ethnic groups in 1941-1944 by the Stalinist regime.
Representatives of Russian regions were transported to the
vacated places. There are studies on this issue. That's why
Crimea has always been a centre of Soviet things
throughout the years of Ukraine's independence, and I used
to call it a ‘Soviet reserve’. That is, this nostalgia for Soviet
times was most prevalent there. In particular, because a lot
of the immigrants were representatives of various state
institutions of the Soviet government, the KGB, the military
elite, and so on, that is, the Black Sea Fleet was based in
Sevastopol and other regions.’ (expert interview)
One expert said that Crimean residents distinguish between those who have
lived on the peninsula for a long time and those who moved after the Russian
occupation. Relations between locals and newcomers are strained.
‘When such a mighty movement of people from the
mainland Russian Federation to Crimea began, they were
called “ponayekhy”. So, Crimeans did not accept all those
who arrived in Crimea after Crimea's annexation. They were
called “ponayekhy”, which caused certain conflicts between
Crimeans and those who moved.’ (expert interview)
1.3. Crimean Tatars living outside Crimea
Crimean Tatars who left for mainland Ukraine can be divided into three
categories: political figures and civic activists who were under threat of repression by
Russia because of their activities; representatives of religious groups who also sought
safety from persecution; and ordinary civilians, including those who were interested in
educating their children in Ukrainian universities or who did not want to be mobilised
after 24 February 2022. Like the members of this ethnic group who remained in
Crimea, Crimean Tatars in the government-controlled area also have a strong sense
of their ethnicity but are more integrated into Ukrainian society and inclined to feel part
of the Ukrainian political nation. Forced displacement prompted them to improve their
27
knowledge of the Ukrainian language (as life after deportation and living later in
Russian-speaking Crimea did not help Crimean Tatars to learn Ukrainian).
‘But if we're talking about those who left Crimea after
the occupation in 2014, around 70 to 100 thousand people
according to various estimates, it's hard to say how many of
them are Crimean Tatars, but Crimean Tatars indeed make
up a significant part of these people. They went to
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking regions because they
first went to Kherson, to Kherson Oblast. Then a significant
part of them went to, well, at least, I know, Lviv and Vinnytsia
Oblasts. These are Ukrainian-speaking regions. Therefore,
in a certain way, they have now, since that moment, begun
to integrate into the all-Ukrainian context and learn the
Ukrainian language. Many of them know Ukrainian quite
well, which is normal. Therefore, this part of the mainland
Crimean Tatars is much more integrated into Ukrainian
society. I can say that there is already an understanding in
my environment, amongst the Crimean Tatars in particular,
that whilst the Crimean Tatars are a separate ethnic
community, an indigenous people of Ukraine, formed on the
territory of Crimea, they are also part of the all-Ukrainian
nation. They are the Ukrainian people envisaged by the
Constitution, who are the source of power and everything
else.’ (expert interview)
Participants in focus groups with Crimean Tatars from mainland Ukraine
confirmed that they value and are proud of their ethnic origin but see themselves as
part of Ukrainian society. Younger respondents mentioned that 2014 had strengthened
their ethnic identity.
‘...I am proud that I am a Crimean Tatar, that I have
such a nation that has been fighting peacefully for so many
years.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
‘...it's a responsibility, a personal responsibility in
representing yourself as part of your people, in representing
your people as part of Ukrainian society and part of Ukraine.’
(focus group with Crimean Tatars)
28
1.4. Associations with Crimea
1.4.1 Associations with Crimea: residents of the mainland part of Ukraine
who are not Crimean Tatars
Answering an open-ended question about associations with the Crimean
Peninsula in the quantitative survey, 61% of respondents said that for them, Crimea is
Ukraine. A significant proportion of respondents (11% - 14%) associate Crimea with
Crimean Tatars and other indigenous peoples, resorts and recreation, as well as
nature, the sea and mountains. Other associations were mentioned much less
frequently: only 1% of respondents primarily associate Crimea with traitors,
separatists, or negative attitudes towards Ukrainians.
During the focus group discussions, participants expressed different
associations with Crimea. The difference was quite noticeable between the Crimea of
the past and the Crimea of the present. Respondents mostly defined the Crimea of the
past as the Crimea before 2014 or the Crimea of the 20th century. Amongst the most
common associations with the Crimea of the past are the following: beautiful nature,
recreation, resort, children's camps, sea, grief, sense of freedom, Crimean Tatars,
deportation of Crimean Tatars, rich history, multiculturalism, the Crimean War, a
29
historical part of Ukraine, the constant struggle of Crimean Tatars for independence,
and development of industry.
‘...since I have not been to Crimea at all, Crimea is
something so beautiful for me. You know, not from the point
of view of politics, but from the point of view of the
landscape, nature, and so on. For me, it's something like
this... Comparison with the Carpathians, something so nice
and cool, forests, air, sea. For me, it's something as simple
as paradise, as they say. From the past point of view, yes,
there were many wars, and I know for sure that in any case,
no one managed to capture Crimea for a long time, and in
any case, it will always be an island that no one has ever
overcome.’ (focus group with residents of Ukraine who are
not Crimean Tatars)
Focus group respondents associate Crimea today with a military base, danger,
attempted annexation, harassment of Ukrainians, and the launching of missiles into
mainland Ukraine.
According to most focus group participants, Crimea should be part of Ukraine
in the future. However, this process is seen as complicated and lengthy, and the deoccupation and de-Russification of Crimea will be painful and take 10 to 20 years.
Despite the difficulties, respondents express positive expectations for Crimea's
restoration as part of Ukraine after de-occupation.
1.4.2 Associations with Crimea: Crimean Tatars in the mainland part of
Ukraine
Young Crimean Tatar focus group participants noted that their first associations
with Crimea were their parents' homes, families, and native land. One of the
participants reported that when discussing associations with Crimea, somewhat
idealised thoughts come to mind, i.e., the Crimea one wants to see, not the Crimea as
it is. Also, during the focus group, it was suggested that Crimea is always associated
with historical events that directly affect Crimean Tatars.
‘...right now, we said that Crimea is there, family, and
that's all, there is such a feeling, but it refers to a kind of
Crimea in a vacuum, that is, abstractly, the Crimea we would
like to live in. We remember something from the period
before 2014, but we also didn't like many things there, so
when we think about Crimea, we idealise it slightly. We see
it as we would like it to be.’ (focus group with Crimean
Tatars)
30
Young respondents noted that after the occupation, Crimea began to feel
alienated from them, as a sense of alienation emerged, the inner sense of home was
lost.
‘...when you go outside your neighbourhood, from
your house to the city, you feel like a stranger and are in a
parallel reality. I was switching realities; it seemed unreal to
me. It was inconsistent with my idea of Crimea and what
Crimea should be like, as I know it and remember it.’ (focus
group with Crimean Tatars)
‘As for 2014, it is associated with such a routine life.
Nothing so special. 2014 is associated with tension,
uncertainty, and unfreedom. If we look to the future, it is
probably associated with hope for positive changes.’ (focus
group with Crimean Tatars)
Older respondents noted that they associated Crimea before 2014 with freedom
and after 2014 with uncertainty. Instead, one respondent indicated that 2022 gave
hope for change and the return of Crimea to Ukraine. There was a rather interesting
metaphor in which Crimea was called a house under construction before the
occupation and a house with rats after it.
‘Before 2014, let's say, we were still building our
house, let's say. In 2014, rats moved into our house. And the
next step, I believe, will be a complete cleanup and
completion. The completion of our house, our home. And,
let's say, after all the work is done, it will blossom and be
filled with children's voices that will be happy and laughing.’
(focus group with Crimean Tatars)
‘...before 2014, there was a sense of freedom, it was
free to breathe... After 2014, there was a move, relocation,
and complete uncertainty. What, how and why... And after
2022, there was hope. There is hope that everything can still
come back. I hope so.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
1.4.3 Associations with Crimea: residents of Crimea3
Most participants in the in-depth interviews associated Crimea with concepts
such as home, homeland, steppes, fields, sea, and nature. All participants had positive
3 Most of them were representatives of Slavic ethnic groups, with some Crimean Tatars also involved.
31
associations. The value of Crimea is formed by the presence of relatives and the
feeling of Fatherland.
‘This value is formed by Crimea being my native land.
Crimean Tatar blood was formed here. This is a fusion of all
the bloods that have ever lived on the territory of Crimea.
Sarmatians, Chernihivites, Cumans, Scythians, Taurians,
and you can list many more, although there aren’t any others
that come to my mind so quickly. This is a fusion of all blood
types - the nation of the Crimean Tatars was formed. For me,
Crimea is an indigenous land.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
‘...I like the energy. I like the atmosphere here. Maybe
it's because it's all familiar; it's all kind of my own—a lot of
friends, it’s all like, native for me. You go, like... Well, you
feel good when you’re at home, as it were.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents)
‘Crimea is my family... These are pleasant memories
in connection with work and so on from the collective with
which I worked. For example, I do not have any very
unpleasant memories with Crimea. Well, everything is
associated with it, everything. I'm not even talking about the
nature of Crimea.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
One of the respondents noted that for her, living in Crimea had lost its value
since the beginning of the occupation. The respondent tried not to use the word
‘Russia’ and replaced it with the words ‘society’ and ‘the state that now controls
Crimea’.
‘Society. Society has destroyed... this value. I would
like very much for all these people not to be here, and then I
would be happy... in fact, because Crimea is no longer my
exact home. ...I mean, I live with some sweet memories.
When I talk about warm things, it's all about memories. Bring
me back to 2013, and I will be the happiest person in the
world. Society, if you think further, is, in fact, the state that
controls Crimea today. And it can be scary here, too. I never
thought I would be paranoid at all. That is, for example, until
2022, I could still very openly enter a discussion with anyone
here about our preferences. I could very openly express my
opinions and statements. I had a Ukrainian flag hanging in
my house, but I took it down when the full-scale war started
32
because my neighbours' could see my room from their
windows. So, you sometimes think about what you say and
where you say it. When I arrived home in Crimea, I was
terrified. Even though I have a Russian passport. I was given
it without asking much.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
33
2. Current situation in Crimea
2.1. Changes in Crimea over the past ten years
The sources of information about changes in Crimea over the past ten years in
this study are in-depth interviews with residents of the peninsula and experts, as well
as focus groups with Crimean Tatars from the mainland part of Ukraine who are aware
of the situation due to visits to Crimea and/or connections with those who remained
there. These sources primarily reflect the opinions and views of the pro-Ukrainian
community, which is more critical of the consequences of the Russian occupation. We
assume that the pro-Russian part of the Crimean population does not attach much
importance to some of the changes listed below. Instead, it has its own vision of the
positive and negative aspects of life on the peninsula.
Also, the study of Crimean Telegram channels (resonant news, topics
discussed) provides insight into the peninsula's information environment.
The most discussed topics in the Telegram channels of Crimea (from 1 February
2024 to 31 July 2024) are related to:
● War (air raids, military exercises, attacks by the AFU on facilities in Crimea and
Russia, including the Crimean Bridge).
● Terrorist threats (in particular, the terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow
Oblast).
● Putin, the Russian government and the army in a positive light.
● Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government and the Armed Forces in the most
negative way possible, focussing on problems with mobilisation in Ukraine and
the Armed Forces' failures at the frontline.
● Celebrating Victory Day, Russia Day and the reunification of Crimea with
Russia.
● Socio-economic issues and problems: infrastructure repairs and construction,
inflation. Unlike war and politics, these topics are a ‘permitted’ opportunity to
express dissatisfaction with the situation in Crimea.
2.1.1. Migration
As noted above, over the past ten years, Crimea has experienced large-scale
migration from Russia and the occupied territories of Ukraine. Experts estimate that
the peninsula's population has grown by more than 1 million people. On the other hand,
a part of the pre-war population left for mainland Ukraine, post-Soviet countries, and
others. After 2014, the departure was driven by repressions on the peninsula,
unwillingness to live under Russian occupation, and the need to maintain ties with the
Ukrainian state and its institutions. After 2022, the risk of illegal conscription into the
34
Russian army and military threats was added. As a result, the socio-demographic
profile of the Crimean population has undergone significant changes because of the
Russian occupation.
‘And, naturally, the conflict drags on and here in
Crimea, there was a very high probability of even being
mobilised and going, so to speak, to fight against the country
where you were born. Many people left for post-Soviet
countries, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Of those who
had the opportunity to leave, many left. Brothers, friends,
many left the territory of Crimea.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
2.1.2. Sense of safety
One of the consequences of large-scale migration to Crimea for its residents
who lived on the peninsula before the occupation is a negative impact on their sense
of security and trust in the people around them.
‘...the last time I was there was in '21 and early '22, and
even though we are all Russian speakers in Crimea, you
walk around the city and realise that you’re hearing a
different Russian language. And you feel like a stranger in
your home; Simferopol was exactly like that. And during
these ten years, I think that, in principle, the general
atmosphere has changed. It has developed into this feeling
of, I don't know, such a vile fear and distrust; well, for me, it
has some kind of association with 1937, when you don't
know with whom you can talk about anything.’ (focus group
with Crimean Tatars)
Residents of Crimea note that the emergence of new ethnic groups and the
specific behaviour of some representatives has disrupted the public security.
‘I do not like the new ethnic composition of Crimea. It
is frightening. For the first time, we have these Chechens,
Dagestanis, Azerbaijanis visiting. That is, we had had
Crimean Azerbaijanis, but new people have arrived, and it is
complete lawlessness. That is, it’s really scary to be in the
centre of the city at 9 pm, the very centre of the city. You see
a person walking around with a gun in a holster. And it was
relatively few years ago, when was it, probably ‘21, ‘22, no,
probably ‘21, ‘20, ‘21, when people were killed here in the
centre of the city on the street. It's just these comrades right
here... They show who they are. I was once dragged by my
hand in the city centre... This powerful change has caused
35
people who have not been in Crimea long to ask what
happened to the city centre. Under Ukraine, there was the
Patrol Police and Checkpoint Service. But here, there are
three boys from the Russian National Guard, who have a
baton on them, in the best scenario. They walk around in
groups of three and don’t do anything. There is no such
thing as security.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
The feeling of safety has not deteriorated for everyone — another Crimea
resident, a man of retirement age, on the contrary, believes that patrols, street lighting,
and document checks have reduced the level of street crime.
2.1.3. Welfare of the population
Residents of Crimea and experts recognise that Russia has taken specific
measures to improve the well-being of the peninsula's population, especially in the first
years after the attempted annexation. They have increased wages and pensions and
introduced certain social benefits. However, respondents note that the effect of these
measures has become less noticeable over the years.
‘...after all, ten years have passed, and there are
people who ideologically, that is, consciously support the
occupation, who say that no, everything is fine, they see
something positive there, and so on. They have reason to
think so because, believe it or not, Russia has been doing
some positive things in occupied Crimea, but for what
purpose is another question, but they are there.
Infrastructure development, certain social benefits, wages,
especially in the first years of occupation, and relatively high
pensions. Later, it decreased, but some of this history
remains.’ (expert interview)
Crimean residents say that those pensioners who were able to retire at the time
of the occupation (and whose support Russia was trying to gain) benefited the most
from the pension increase. Those who retired later received less, which negatively
affected their satisfaction with their financial situation.
‘Everyone who was already a pensioner at the
moment of the, well, accession to Russia were very lucky,
their pensions were raised twice and determined by a
favourable exchange rate. And they began to immediately
receive something like, well, much more than what the
average pensioners in Russia received. Well, in Russian
money, it was ten years ago that our people started to
receive somewhere between 16,000 and 25,000 Rubles. And
36
the new ones, who started to retire while under Russia,
received 7-8 thousand. And this is the contrast of those who
had to be, as it were, lured.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
‘I can say the standard of living is falling. Although
they say, they're raising it. No, I know when I used to work
and still had some money to save. Now I, well, I don't have
enough. Utilities and groceries eat up everything.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents)
However, it is obvious that all the infrastructure improvements on the peninsula
were actually made for the occupying army and military needs.
2.1.4. State of infrastructure and environment
Residents of Crimea say that since 2014, the infrastructure on the peninsula
has undergone significant changes: a lot of resources have been invested in repairs,
renovation, construction, and agricultural development. This has positive and negative
aspects. On the one hand, it improves the appearance of cities and the condition of
roads and adjacent areas:
‘Roads, yes, roads are constantly being built, streets,
squares, parks are constantly being improved. These are the
things I can notice when walking around the city... So yes, I
see parks, yes, I see roads, yes, I see streets. For example,
my street was repaired for the first time in '22 or '23, for the
first time in my life, even though these are trendy
neighbourhoods. But it was never repaired under Ukraine.
Just never... Or the street lighting.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
On the other hand, the Crimean environment, including nature reserves, where
construction and deforestation was prohibited under Ukrainian law, is suffering from
intensive construction.
‘And what's happening now, everything is rolling in
asphalt here. The territory is being seized, and construction
is underway. We have a tiny town, and they're building the
Tavrida Highway next to it. And in all of this they're building
high-rise buildings. What was not allowed in Ukraine and
was once a nature reserve, now no one looks at it, no one at
all. They are building high-rise, 12-storey buildings and 9-
storey buildings, but at the same time, we still have no
sewage treatment plants... the money is going to the wrong
place, let's put it this way. It's going to the entertainment
37
infrastructure to smudge the eyes... It's very pathetic to
watch. When the road was being built, I just couldn't drive
on that road. It is huge, it is a highway with so many forks,
so many things there, this Tavrida. But simultaneously, all
the plants and the forests close to this road were cut down.’
(in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
2.1.5. Employment in Crimea
Crimean residents note contradictory trends in employment opportunities in
Crimea. On the one hand, infrastructure projects and businesses are creating new
jobs, including high-paying ones. On the other hand, there have been observations
that some companies have lost jobs and become more hierarchical and remote in their
management, with the organisational centre moving to Russia.
‘The fact that they have this Tavrida, that they are
building a Tavrida for themselves, for us it is... Yes, they
have opened jobs, and almost the whole city has gone there
because the salary is 45 thousand Rubles, starting at 45
thousand. We do not have such prices in the city, and no
one pays such a salary. Almost everyone works there, well,
whoever can.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
‘It's such a power vertical... If we had a meeting with
Ukrainian Railways here, the chief engineers and everyone
would decide everything at the factory, they would sit at the
same table and just communicate. It's just unrealistic to
imagine in Russia, that someone of that level would come to
us, again, to perform these or those tests... The factories
have become worse... If there were, let's say, 700 people, 800
people working there, well, these are small enterprises for
Crimea, some of which are decent, then now there would
only be 200 people.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
Small businesses in Crimea, particularly those related to tourism and recreation,
were reported to be experiencing difficulties. One respondent said that supply chains
from abroad were monopolised by large businesses affiliated with the state (‘feudal
lords’), and small businesses were forced to buy from them at inflated prices,
negatively impacting their incomes. In addition, small businesses cannot compete with
large ones because of the latter's scale and access to administrative leverage, so they
are forced to cooperate on the terms of the ‘feudal lord’.
‘But it has become much more difficult to work with
business. After all, they are feudal lords; they crush
everyone under their thumb. And, in general, it is tough for
38
small businesses. All of our businesses have somehow
fallen under these feudal lords. It is difficult with the feudal
lords. Well, where do we go?.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
‘...in Koktebel, they closed it for three years. Can you
imagine completely rebuilding the city’s boardwalk and the
seaside area there? They just demolished it. That charm and
that Koktebel will never exist again. They are just making it
to suit themselves. Some asphalt, some paths, some this
and that. And now, can you imagine, for three years, these
people who live off tourism and these visitors, even these
Russians, will not have a living? They will have no income
for three years. At all. I mean, at all. No one will compensate
them.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
2.1.6. Ideological Influence of Russia
All groups of respondents—experts, residents of Ukraine and Crimea, and
Crimean Tatars—mentioned Russia's intensive propaganda work with the Crimean
population at all levels. According to the study participants, this work is quite effective
and affects everyone, including pro-Ukrainian people.
‘We must understand that propaganda has grown so
much over the years that it has penetrated everywhere. Even
those who are 100% pro-Ukrainian in their position and
thinking are also influenced by it because it is everywhere.’
(focus group with Crimean Tatars)
One of the directions of propaganda is aimed at glorifying Russia and creating
the worst possible image of Ukraine as a ‘fascist state’ that has left its citizens to fend
for themselves and has done nothing good for them. Much attention is paid to creating
a picture of positive changes after the occupation of the peninsula:
‘The narrative that everything has changed is being
promoted very strongly. I follow many Russian-orientated
public groups in Crimea itself, in Simferopol, the
“Simferopol” groups, “Yevpatoriya”, and others. And
before, even a year ago, they were not so political, so openly
political. For the last six months or so, they have been
strongly promoting the image of change for the better. “This
is how it was ten years ago: everything was bad, in decline,
and dying. Now, look how we have repaired the waterside
area or something”. And all this, together with music,
festivals, some cultural layers and influences, in the
39
absence of any powerful alternative, of course, like a
magnet, I think, attracts people there.’ (expert interview)
Another area is the justification of war and the general militarisation of the public
consciousness, especially amongst minors.
‘If you look through the textbooks that help children
study at schools in the Russian Federation, including in
Crimea, you will see that war is all over the place. And war,
during any historical period, is not presented as evil. It is
presented as a way to achieve a certain goal and always as
a positive one. I reread 23 textbooks that were brought here
from Kherson Oblast by the prosecutor's office. They made
an expert analysis of these textbooks to determine the main
narratives that are embedded in them. And I was stunned.
I'm a history teacher, and I was astonished by how the
content of the textbooks was transformed. Well, it is almost
all based on war. The main mythologeme that promotes the
theme of war as a value is the great “victory”, the Great
Patriotic War. And this “victory” begins on 1 January and
ends on 31 December.’ (expert interview)
In general, the stories of the study participants suggest that Russia is relatively
successful in broadcasting Russian narratives about Ukraine, the West, war, history,
international relations, government, and other ideological and value messaging in
Crimea, taking advantage of the fact that it essentially controls the information space
on the peninsula. Crimean residents reported that they still find opportunities to receive
information from Ukrainian sources, but their answers suggest that this is a
consequence of their own desires and needs.
The results of the monitoring of Crimean Telegram channels confirm and
supplement the above observations. The most discussed topics in the Crimean
Telegram channels (from 1 February 2024 to 31 July 2024) are related to:
● War (air raids, military exercises, attacks by the AFU on facilities in Crimea and
Russia, including the Crimean Bridge).
● Terrorist threats (in particular, the terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall).
● Putin, the Russian government and the army in a positive light.
● Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government and the Armed Forces in the most
negative way possible, focussing on problems with mobilisation in Ukraine and
the Armed Forces' failures at the front.
● Celebrating Victory Day, Russia Day and the reunification of Crimea with
Russia.
40
● Socio-economic issues and problems: infrastructure repairs and construction,
inflation. Unlike war and politics, these topics are a ‘permitted’ opportunity to
express dissatisfaction with the situation in Crimea.
An analysis of audience reactions to the messages shows that readers of proRussian Crimean Telegram channels generally perceive events through the same
prism as the authors of the posts: they support the Russian authorities, have a strongly
negative attitude towards the Ukrainian authorities and the Armed Forces, are
concerned about military and terrorist threats, mostly approve of initiatives to
commemorate memorable dates, and express dissatisfaction with social and economic
problems that directly affect their comfort and well-being.
The monitoring of reports on education in Crimea has highlighted numerous
examples of innovations proposed or implemented in educational institutions that
foster a sense of patriotism towards Russia, respect for ‘traditional values’, and support
for the so-called ‘special military operation’ amongst children and youth.
2.1.7. Repression of Dissidents
All groups of respondents - experts, residents of Ukraine and Crimea, Crimean
Tatars - mentioned repression faced by those whose activities or public position
contradict the official line of the Russian authorities or whose loyalty is in doubt.
‘Only loyal things exist. What is not loyal is called
extremist. The members of these groups are imprisoned,
and, as we know, first, they are persecuted, interrogated,
searched, raided, and then given huge Stalinist prison
terms. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about any disloyal
or neutral activism... Everything active and alive has left.’
(expert interview)
‘Now, in Crimea, there is a real medieval witch hunt.
That is, some professional informers are looking for
enemies in social networks and in neighbourhood
conversations, reporting them to the special services, and
these people work it all out, if not all of it, then they just put
it in their work queue.’ (expert interview)
In particular, the Russian special services focus on ethnic organisations, whose
activities are formally allowed, but only if the organisation declares the priority of
Russian civic identity over ethnicity.
‘There is a Ukrainian community, a community of
Bulgarians, Germans, etc. What was there for Ukraine, let's
say, has been preserved. But now, they are under the tight
cover of the special services and the government that
41
finances all these national organisations. Therefore, they
are allowed this small space of self-identification. Still, it's
like a matryoshka doll; this self-identification of
representatives of certain ethnic groups stands in a big
matryoshka of the Russian Federation. “We, the citizens of
the Russian Federation, are a little different, but we are all
Russians”. This is strictly controlled, and there are no
deviations. And we see in Russia itself how representatives
of organisations of ethnic, well, representatives of
indigenous peoples are persecuted, how much influence the
special services have there and how they persecute those
who go beyond this matryoshka.’ (expert interview)
‘In Crimea, the occupation policy has been going on
for a very long time, based on social and ideological
engineering to displace all identities except the Russian
identity. Even though Russia declares its attention to
national minorities, the de facto policy is based on pushing
out, emasculating, erasing, as the English word ‘cancel’
means, all identities of small groups, including the Ukrainian
identity.’ (expert interview)
2.1.8. Values and Worldview changes amongst Crimean residents
Ideological influence and repression against dissidents naturally affected the
values and worldview of Crimean residents, as discussed mostly by experts. First, the
values of security, particularly security from persecution, have become much more
relevant.
‘Even up until 2022, it's hard for me now to imagine
how this is happening now, but even by 2022, I was there
last in 2021, some of my relatives were afraid of something
even when they were in the kitchen, or if they were asked
something, they would start whispering about something.
Very quietly, quickly, in our native language, because there
is less of a chance that they will be accurately translated or
something else. This level of fear was strange to me. [...] In
Crimea, in a neighbourhood where mostly Crimean Tatars
live, parents with children, children with children, and
grandparents with small children, they hardly speak their
native language. And I am sure, from what I have
researched, that they are first afraid of an allegedly
unhealthy, inadequate reaction to the manifestation of their
identity in the form of language. If they do speak, they
always speak quietly. And it's not customary to speak in the
42
native language, especially to speak loudly.’ (expert
interview)
Secondly, according to one expert, a passive attitude and learned helplessness
are flourishing amongst Crimeans.
‘I can see it in the people I talk to. And the main
opinion of these people is that we do not influence anything.
Some big leaders are somewhere, and we do not influence
them. And this is formed quite systematically.’ (expert
interview)
Third, Crimean residents observe that Crimeans lack cohesion: in most
situations, they are atomised and avoid interfering in the affairs of others.
‘The only thing that unites Crimea is this whole ‘Z’-
story. Here, the Crimeans are united by their political view.
Well, the Crimeans were not very united at all. These are my
problems, and these are your problems. I think we generally
had that in common. I didn't see a lot of us being all together.
We are all together when something threatens us... When I
see help on the street, I see it as an exception to the rule.’
(in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
2.1.9. Situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea
The situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea, according to participants in focus
group discussions amongst representatives of the ethnic group and experts, has
become more complicated since the Russian occupation of the peninsula. The
participants of the study highlighted the following changes:
● Attempts by the Russian occupation administration to blur the ethnic identity of
Crimean Tatars and increase their loyalty to Russia and the Russian occupation
administration:
‘Speaking of Crimean Tatars, we see an active
blurring of the Crimean Tatar identity via other nationalities
living in Russia, well, with the help of other nationalities.
This is a cultural attempt to combine Tatars with people from
the Caucasus or someone else somehow.’ (focus group with
Crimean Tatars)
‘The Crimean Tatars are a people who… Although
they do not say that they are an indigenous people,
according to their, let's say, logic, according to their
narratives, the Crimean Tatars are a foreign people who
came from Asia and lived in Crimea only a little bit. Sorry, in
Russian Crimea, as they see it, they lived for a little bit, and
43
that's it. But [those in power] are trying, on the one hand, to
suppress them and, on the other hand, to help them to
“develop”. For example, they created the Crimean Tatar
channel “Millet” (“Nation”), which broadcasts in the
Crimean Tatar language. This is a television channel. But if
you look at the content of this Crimean Tatar channel, or
rather this channel that broadcasts in the Crimean Tatar
language, it is generally Russian content about how bad
Ukraine is and how Crimean Tatars suffered in Ukraine. If
Russia will be there, they will live there happily ever after,
whilst Ukraine was destroying them.’ (expert interview)
● Numerous cases of repressions against members of the Crimean Tatar
community, whom the Russian occupation administration consider disloyal:
‘If we look at the statistics conducted by our
organisations and based on the results of the activities of
this Russian occupation centre for countering extremism,
we will see that amongst the detainees, the vast majority are
Crimean Tatars. That is, what Russia calls extremism is
simply a strong civic position of the Crimean Tatars.’ (expert
interview)
● Crimean Tatars face economic difficulties, avoiding cooperation with those they
consider collaborators:
‘The people are under occupation, the only people
who earn money are those close to the collaborators, who
are friends with them. They are the only ones who are given
contracts and have the opportunity to earn money. The rest
of us don't have such an opportunity and are scrambling to
make money wherever we can.’ (focus group with Crimean
Tatars)
● Interference of the Russian occupation administration in the religious life of
Crimean Tatars and politicisation of religion (attempts to promote narratives
favourable to the Russian occupation administration through religious
institutions, for example, regarding attitudes towards the war):
‘The second situation is that they have taken over the
Muslim administration, or rather the administration of the
religious structure that manages religious feelings in
Crimea. That is, it is now also working for the occupiers, and
it is through this structure that they are trying to influence
the Crimean Tatars so that their loyalty to the occupation
authorities would increase. Anyone who disagrees with this,
let's say, interpretation of the activities of this “spiritual
44
administration”, they call them radicals or something else.
And, you know, in this situation, that person will at least end
up under, let's say, supervision, and at most, they will end
up in prison.’ (expert interview)
● A ban on holding mass gatherings, including for traditional events or
celebrations:
‘It has become a little more difficult to carry out our
traditions, indigenous to the Crimean Tatars. On May 18, the
day of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, we always had
a big rally in the centre of Simferopol when we were under
Ukraine. 20-30 thousand people gathered, and all these
people walked. Mostly, let's say, they prayed; that is, they
recited words from prayers. Since 2014, unfortunately, such
events have been forbidden. Large gatherings of people are
also prohibited according to the rules, even at a wedding
when a convoy of cars gather. Either you must coordinate it
or pay a fine if someone punishes you for it.’ (focus group
with Crimean Tatars)
It was also mentioned that schools do not pay enough attention to teaching the
Crimean Tatar language, so children do not know it well.
The results of the content analysis of Crimean Telegram channels show that
pro-Russian writers cover ethnic relations through the prism of the successful
integration of different peoples into the ‘big family’ of Crimea, emphasising the
preservation of historical memory and the importance of commemorative dates for
maintaining national identity and interethnic peace in Crimea. Cases of discrimination
or harassment of ordinary Crimean Tatars are demonstrably condemned (this does not
apply to situations where the Russian occupation administration accuse individual
representatives of extremism, sabotage, etc.). At the same time, bloggers close to the
occupation administration can severely criticise certain representatives of the Crimean
Tatars. For example, blogger Talipov aggressively called for the renaming of a street
in the village, which is named in honour of Mustafa Dzhemilev:
‘In the village of Zolotoe Polye of Kirov district of the
Republic of Crimea, the street of Mustafa Dzhemilev
appeared. Mustafa Dzhemilev is a traitor to the Crimean
Tatar people, a criminal on whom criminal cases have been
opened; he is on the federal wanted list, the organiser of the
energy and food blockade of Crimea, a market who claims
that soon the AFU will enter Crimea.
Judging by the cadastral map, it is a new quarter that
is free from development. The cadastral map plots appeared
in December 2022.
45
I have a question for the village authorities: Are you
doing well? What guided them when they accepted the
street's name? Who is the initiator, and when was the
initiative submitted? Didn't you notice the name when you
consented to the execution of documents or when you
issued permits?
Are you satisfied with everything, or is it necessary to
eliminate this unfortunate misunderstanding?’ (TalipoV
Online Telegram Channel)
2.1.10. Impact of the full-scale invasion
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has affected the situation and well-being
of Crimean residents. First, those liable for military service now face the risk of being
mobilised into the Russian army, which is not popular even with the pro-Russian part
of the population. As noted above, some men have left Crimea to avoid participating
in hostilities.
‘Pro-Russian collaborators and most of the swamp I'm
talking about, they support the so-called “special military
operation”. But when it started to affect their loved ones,
they started to look at it differently.’ (expert interview)
Secondly, transportation links between Crimea and the mainland part of Ukraine
have been cut off, deepening the separation of some families.
‘Because I had relatives living there, my brother. And
since the beginning of the full-scale war, they have lost the
opportunity to return to Crimea to come and see their
parents. And this is one of the most important things.
Although at one point, there were at least some ways to see
your parents, friends, and so on, now it is impossible. And
naturally, the conflict is dragging on, and here in Crimea,
there was a very high probability of even being mobilised
and going to fight against the country in which you were
born.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
Thirdly, after 24 February 2024, repression against dissidents intensified:
‘There is a noticeable tendency that people have
begun to speak their thoughts out loud less often, because
it had become quite dangerous. If before, it was more or less
dangerous, you could somehow sweat it out, but now
thinking out loud is a real opportunity to go to jail quickly
and for a very long time.’ (expert interview)
46
Fourth, the outbreak of a major war affected the psychological well-being of
Crimeans. Ukraine's struggle inspired some Crimeans, but others were frightened and
depressed.
‘Here, when Ukraine fought back, for the first few
months, it fought back. I’m sorry, but they kicked the socalled second army of the world in the teeth, and they saw
that Ukraine can fight. This, in a way, raised morale.’ (expert
interview)
‘...24 February came, and I realise I can't do anything
else here. It's impossible to live here anymore... it's
completely wrecking my nervous system. [...] I lost my sense
of home. I always had this sense of home: Crimea, Ukraine,
this is home... there is no stability because, in Crimea, I don't
feel a sense of home in my own house.’ (in-depth interviews
with Crimean residents)
Eventually, over time, Crimeans began to be directly affected by the hostilities,
as Ukraine began to launch long-range strikes against targets in Crimea.
2.2. Awareness of the current situation in Crimea and the
mainland part of Ukraine
2.2.1. Self-assessment of awareness amongst residents of the mainland
part of Ukraine, sources of information and media coverage of the
situation in Crimea
2.2.1.1. Citizens of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars
Both quantitative and qualitative studies show that there is not enough
information about Crimea in the media of the mainland part of Ukraine. Only 8% of
respondents to the quantitative study believe that Ukrainian media provide enough
information about Crimea, and another 30% consider it rather sufficient. At the same
time, the majority feels the need for more information.
47
Only 9% of respondents consider themselves sufficiently informed about the
Crimean Peninsula, and another 28% say they are rather well informed. At the same
time, the majority say they do not know enough.
48
Focus group participants hardly ever mention the editorial policy of the
Ukrainian media as a reason for the current situation, trying to explain that the lack of
information is due to objective difficulties. Respondents attributed the lack of
information about Crimea to the fact that independent media have limited access to
the peninsula, and the local population is reluctant to share information for fear of
reprisal. Some respondents would like to receive news about Crimea, not from
Ukrainian or Russian media, but from media from countries not involved in the war.
‘Because a lot is happening there, and we don't
understand it. For example, I don't know what is happening
with the people who stayed there, with the military who
switched from the Ukrainian Navy to the Russian Navy, so
after 2022, as they say, this is a dark spot for me.
There are very few, let's say, sources, and you must
look for them and be self-motivated. The local population is
not eager to share their opinions because they can get
scolded. And some independent sources of information do
not get there either. For example, even foreign journalists
simply do not have the goal to go there and cover the
situation at the moment. Because of this, there is very little
information, and because of this, most of the Ukrainian
population has the opinion that the vast majority there
49
support Russia, and this is not entirely true in reality.’ (focus
group with residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
Young Crimean Tatars also agree with the fact that between 2014 and 2022,
Crimea occupied a disproportionately small share of Ukraine's information space:
‘If we talk about the past, Crimea held 1.5% of Ukraine's
information space. This is before the full-scale invasion. Well,
1.5% of the information was about the region, well, sorry, but
there was more information about Odesa, Lviv, Volyn, and
Zhytomyr Oblasts than about the occupied territory and
everything happening there. That is, it was a problem. Now,
whether there is such a problem, I cannot say for sure, but I
cannot say that there is enough historical information.’
(focus group with Crimean Tatars)
At the same time, some experts offer a more frank and controversial explanation
for the lack of information about Crimea in the Ukrainian media: a passive policy on
the de-occupation of the peninsula, which has resulted in a lack of significant media
attention to this issue and a small number of news stories.
‘So, we need more information and more real cases.
Believe me, when we are told that “little is being written about
Crimea”, I ask: “what should we write?”. For Crimea, and
about Crimea. I'm showing you what they used to do before
the invasion when some survey agencies conducted a survey
to see how much content there was about Crimea, and they
said, “Not enough, not enough”. What was there to tell? [The
politician] Refat Chubarov once took great offence at me
when I said, ‘So you do something. We will talk about it’.
There is nothing to say. The policy on Crimea is not being
implemented.’ (expert interview)
Some young focus group participants say that they do not even understand
basic things about the situation in Crimea now, such as whether there are any
problems with water, food, etc.
‘In general, there is very little information about how
people live, how they are doing, whether they have enough
water or food, maybe they have some problems there. We
do not know what exactly is happening in the occupied
territories, how the residents are treated there, whether they
are in danger or not.’ (focus group with residents of Ukraine
who are not Crimean Tatars)
50
According to respondents, the situation for Crimean Tatars is also tricky for the
average news consumer to understand fully.
‘We very often talk about Crimea as the Crimean
Tatars, but, as far as I know, not much can be said about the
Crimean Tatars in Crimea. Even from the point of view of
news. That is, just the absence of such events or any
activities implies that we do not have a lot of news about
Crimea and Crimean Tatars in general.’ (focus group with
residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
Some respondents lack information about the motivation of pro-Russian
Crimeans and their assessment of the current situation on the peninsula. Today,
respondents most often see news about strikes on Russian military targets in Crimea,
coverage of Russian crimes, and information about the actions of the Yellow Ribbon
partisan resistance movement. Amongst the most recent stories, respondents recalled
how the National Preserve of Tauric Chersonesos, a UNESCO World Heritage Site,
was destroyed by the Russians; news about the preparation of the Crimean bridge
blowing up; the destruction of warehouses and military bases in Crimea, and a
programme about the impact of the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power on
the North Crimean Canal. Amongst the topics of most interest to respondents were
war-related events, the situation of Crimean residents under occupation, including
illegal abductions, the history of Crimea and Crimean Tatars, human rights protection,
and information about fundamental changes in the life of Crimea after the temporary
occupation.
Respondents from the mainland part of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars
primarily hear about Crimea on social media (Telegram, YouTube, TikTok), television
(1+1, STB, the telethon ‘United News’), radio (Radio NV), and through personal
communication with their friends. Telegram channels used by participants to follow
information about Crimea included: ‘Lachen writes’, ‘STERNENKO’, ‘Trukha Ukraina’,
‘Trukha Krym’, ‘Insider UA’, ‘Times of Ukraine’, ‘Mykolaivsky Vanyok’, and ‘Real
Crimea’, Amongst the YouTube channels mentioned were ‘Real History’ and
‘Comedian Plus Historian’, and respondents also follow Crimean bloggers who cover
their lives in Crimea on YouTube. Also mentioned in the context of media covering
news about Crimea were ‘Ukrayinska Pravda’, ‘Suspilne’, ‘Babel’, ‘New Voice’, and
‘TSN’.
According to most respondents, ties between the mainland part of Ukraine and
Crimea have remained only at the level of interpersonal relations. Many Ukrainians
have friends and relatives who remained in the temporary occupied Crimea, and it has
become quite challenging to keep in touch with them. It was noted that over time,
communication with acquaintances from Crimea stops and ties are severed, mainly
due to Russian propaganda that turns Crimean residents against Ukraine.
Respondents reported that when communicating with their relatives in Crimea, they
51
avoid topics related to politics and war and discuss only family issues. Many note that
interpersonal ties cannot withstand a full-scale invasion in 2022 and quickly fade away.
2.2.1.2. Citizens of Ukraine who are Crimean Tatars
Senior representatives of Crimean Tatars say they follow all the information
about Crimea available in the information space. Those who can do so also keep in
touch with friends and relatives on the peninsula. Respondents named several
resources from which they get information about the situation in Crimea, including TV
channels, radio stations, and content from civil society organisations on social media.
- ATR - Crimean Tatar TV channel;
- MeydanFM - Crimean Tatar radio;
- Suspilne Krym, a TV channel of the Public Broadcasting Company;
- CANLI Radio;
- Crimea Realities;
- Crimean Tatar Sort and Cardinal News Production;
- content from ‘Crimean Solidarity’;
- Facebook page ‘Crimean Tatar Resource Centre’;
- The Mejlis, the representative body of Crimean Tatars and the equivalent of a
parliament.
According to both older and younger Crimean Tatars, there is insufficient
information about Crimea. Media resources covering Crimea's situation do not receive
sufficient support and funding, leading to reduced or terminated activities. The
emergence of the Crimean Platform and the adoption of the Law ‘On Indigenous
Peoples of Ukraine’ significantly impacted the return of the Crimean issue to the
agenda in the Ukrainian information environment. To establish the possibility of
influencing the population of temporarily occupied Crimea, one of the respondents
noted that it is necessary to restore the state television and radio company ‘Crimea’.
Respondents also pointed out that it is vital to return the ATR TV channel to the air:
‘When the return of the Crimean Tatars to their
ancestral land began in 1990, the press did not write much
about it; there was not much information. And when the ATR
TV channel, the first and only Crimean Tatar TV channel, was
created, everyone rejoiced. Why? First, these were the first
programmes in the Crimean Tatar language. And secondly,
the most truthful information came from this TV channel...
52
But recently, they stopped funding this channel. I don't know
for what reasons, unfortunately...’ (focus group with
Crimean Tatars)
Young representatives of the Crimean Tatars noted that they also learn
information about Crimea from their friends and relatives, media that write about
Crimea (ATR, Crimea Realities, MeydanFM) and civil society organisations
(CrimeaSOS, ZMINA, Almenda, Crimean Solidarity). In addition, they noted that they
get information from officials and bodies, including the Mejlis and Refat Chubarov and
other civil society activists of Crimea, including political prisoners. They also use such
sources as Crimean Tatar groups in social networks and Russian and Ukrainian news.
The topics of most interest to all respondents are military operations on the territory of
Crimea, the general situation on the peninsula, the issue of the mobilisation of Crimean
residents, detentions, arrests, and repressions.
‘...I am interested in the issue of mobilisation, how it
is carried out, how it is violated. Because this is an
international crime, a violation of conventions, and a
violation of international law. It is connected to detentions
and arrests, we are interested in this and are constantly
recording it, trying to document it. It is also connected to the
closure of Crimean Tatar schools, classes, etc. That is,
everything connected to the violation of collective and
individual rights... As for the explosions related to the war in
Crimea, of course, we are also concerned about this.’ (focus
group with Crimean Tatars)
Both older and younger representatives of the Crimean Tatars noted that
sometimes the media can be inaccurate in their coverage of the situation in Crimea.
The reasons for this may be the work of the Russian PSYOPS or the incompetence of
organisations that cover content about Crimea.
‘Very often, due to personal views on a particular
situation, the media covers an event from one side. It’s very
often PSYOPS, even the Ukrayinska Pravda Telegram
channels and media, even they fell for it and threw in some
false information. You can trust someone, but this person or
media outlet can take some information that is not true.’
(focus group with Crimean Tatars)
‘...there is also a factor that, in my opinion, does a
disservice to the Crimean Tatar people, when some
organisations, not being competent in these matters, take
on the task of writing or simply copying or plagiarising
53
information, but then presenting it in a worse format.’ (focus
group with Crimean Tatars)
The trends in interpersonal communication between Crimean Tatars living in
Ukraine and their relatives and friends who remained in temporarily occupied Crimea
are like those reported by participants in focus groups with Ukrainians: political topics
and war issues are not discussed, and information exchange is less intense.
‘Of course, we are in touch. There are relatives, my
relatives, my wife's relatives, and friends from my previous
place of work. We keep in touch mainly by electronic means.
At first, if there was a telephone connection, we could
communicate that way. Now, we only use WhatsApp or
Telegram. We text, talk, share things. But lately, I've noticed
that there is less information. People are afraid, so we don't
talk about general topics anymore. Not even about the social
situation in Crimea. I'm not talking about politics or
something else.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
‘...I am in Kyiv; my family is in Crimea. And, naturally,
when I talk to my family by phone or video, they are used to
it; they have accepted the frightening situation around them.
They never use the words ‘aggressor’, ‘invasion’, they never
use the words ‘war’, ‘missile’, ‘planes’. That is, they avoid
any phrases associated with the occupation of Crimea… I
understand them. I even lived there under occupation for a
year, almost a year... It felt like all the phone conversations
were being tapped. I don't know to what extent that was
actually the case, but it was always like that.’ (focus group
with Crimean Tatars)
2.2.2. Awareness of Crimean residents about the situation in the
mainland part of Ukraine
All the respondents who live in Crimea regularly or occasionally follow the news
about Ukraine. They receive information about events in Ukraine from social media,
mainly Telegram, YouTube, Facebook and Instagram. Amongst the Telegram
channels used by respondents to follow the news about Ukraine, NEXTA Live and
Mykolaivsky Vanyok were mentioned. YouTube channels such as Politeka Online,
Oleksandr Shelest, Mykhailo Chaplyha, and Ruslan Bortnyk were also mentioned.
Internet resources and TV channels were also mentioned, including Radio Liberty, RIA
Novosti, ICTV, and 1+1. In addition, participants noted that they follow well-known
Ukrainian personalities and politicians on social media, such as Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
54
Petro Poroshenko, and Oleksiy Goncharenko. Russian bloggers, such as Michael
Nacke, were also mentioned in the context of consuming news about Ukraine.
‘Ukraine, I love my people so much, and Ukraine in
general, both territorially and in general. [I can’t imagine
collaborating], I have no such thoughts. Pride for my
country. I watch, say, 1+1 every day to stay connected. You
must be in touch daily to stay connected and communicate
with your relatives and friends. That's one thing. And there
must be some kind of information flow that we can maintain
as much as possible. For me, in Ukraine, what people are
doing and what is happening there now shows how strong
the people are. It's horrible what is happening. This is a
rebellious people. It is impossible to subdue them.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents)
The respondents are most interested in Ukraine's context regarding warfare on
Ukraine’s territory and politics. It was noted that watching Ukrainian news is prohibited
in Crimea, but those who want to watch it still find ways to do so, such as using VPN
services.
‘I am interested. I mostly watch analysts on YouTube,
which may be blocked soon by my internet provider. I will
watch them through a VPN, like I do when I scroll on social
media like Instagram, Facebook, etc. I watch bloggers. I'm
interested in politics and in supporting the countries of the
EU and the US. How they, so to speak, whether they help,
whether they don't help and so on. In my family, my father
loves politics very much. He watches a lot of Ukrainian
political bloggers, and even if I miss something, I always
hear from him. The latest news and so on. That is, as long
as there is YouTube and the Internet, we still get some
news.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
‘...until 1 August, YouTube was helpful for us. News
was drawn from there, from those sources, from Ukrainian
sources, from live broadcasts, from the programmes of
bloggers, and I had news channels and everything else, now
we are deprived. Unfortunately, there is a huge shortage. I
just don't know what sources to subscribe to, like Telegram
or some news channels... I am naturally interested in military
actions, and what is happening to cities, to people.’ (indepth interviews with Crimean residents)
55
Some respondents indicated they continue to follow the Ukrainian political
agenda and news as if ‘by inertia’, not so emotionally.
‘...some internal political issues. I think, well,
Ukrainian correspondents are just somehow more lively,
human, and interesting. I don't know; by inertia, you just
kind of watch whatever is going on. You know, like, there's
news, you just watch the news.... I can't explain it. Why do
you need it? Like, I don't know... my old memory doesn’t
help me. I don't know, I can't explain.’ (in-depth interviews
with Crimean residents)
56
3. Civic engagement and social cohesion
3.1. Social cohesion of residents of the mainland part
of Ukraine
Participants in the focus group discussions noted that since the beginning of the
full-scale invasion, the cohesion of the mainland part of Ukraine residents has
increased significantly. However, over time, people are less willing to sacrifice their
time and resources to help others, although the overall level of cohesion remains high.
In the focus group with the Crimean Tatars, it was noted that members of this
ethnic group always come to each other's aid. The cohesion of the Crimean Tatars is
also manifested in the desire to liberate their homeland and end the war. In this context,
one of the respondents shared the story of how the Crimean Tatar people helped him
with his medical treatment:
‘We cannot all think the same and act the same. There
are some disagreements, and everyone has their interests,
which is evident. But I believe we are mostly united in a
single impulse and desire to end this war and liberate our
land.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
‘The Crimean Tatar people, in general, are such a
specific people. They are not simple. But in a difficult
moment, people pull together. They don't look at
grievances; they don't look at anything. They just pull
together. А disease knocked me down. And thanks to our
leaders, thanks to the Mejlis, thanks to my people, I say this
with pride, because it’s thanks to them all. The doctors said
I have no more than three months to live. I've been alive for
over two and a half years now.’ (focus group with the
Crimean Tatars)
Participants in the focus group discussions comparing the level of cohesion
between residents of the mainland part of Ukraine and Crimea noted that it was lower
in Crimea. Many participants lacked the knowledge of the situation in Crimea to
understand the reasons for this. Still, they acknowledged that cohesion in Crimea is
lower due to the absence of shelling and constant threats to life, as well as repression
by the Russian occupation administration, which makes each person think about their
own life first and foremost rather than helping other people. According to the
participants, a small number of Crimean residents who belong to the Yellow Ribbon
guerrilla movement are united.
57
In contrast, the level of cohesion amongst residents of the mainland part of
Ukraine was highest at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Still, it has weakened
over time due to certain factors (political scandals, corruption, and people's fatigue
from the protracted war). However, respondents characterised the cohesion of
Ukrainians as high; as proactive communities continue to operate, fundraisers rapidly
reach their goals for the needs of the army, and many people are involved in helping
victims of shelling and in clearing rubble. In general, it was noted that Ukrainians tend
to unite and support each other in difficult times.
‘...the cohesion [of Ukrainians] has decreased a little
bit compared to 2022, as it was in the first half of the year
when everyone was volunteering and trying to help
somehow; now I hear more disappointment and despair
from people. There is cohesion, but it is not as great as it
used to be. And I think the situation is the same in Crimea
because this has been going on there for ten years, so they
most likely tried to do something in 2014, 2015, 2016, maybe
a little more. And then people broke down, somehow
succumbed to this influence. One person may have
succumbed for the sake of their lives, while another just
changed their mind and pro-Russian thoughts appeared, so
there is less cohesion there.’ (focus group with non-Crimean
Tatar residents of Ukraine)
‘...for Ukrainians, the highest level of cohesion is
inherent when the situation becomes most critical. The level
was extremely high in the first months at the beginning of
the full-scale invasion. Accordingly, when the military
operations entered a protracted phase, the level of cohesion
slowly fell... As for the cohesion in the territory of Crimea, it
seems to me that every year, it is becoming less and less
because everyone understands that for such cohesion, they
receive repressions. It is unclear how effective their
cohesion will be, regarding their security and any social
impact on the current situation in Crimea.’ (focus group with
residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
3.2. Social cohesion and civic engagement of
Crimean residents
Experts and Crimean residents agree that society in Crimea is primarily divided,
atomised, and capable of uniting only in the event of a common problem. A significant
contribution to this situation was made by the threat of repression by the Russian
58
occupation administration against dissidents and civic activists who do not
demonstrate loyalty.
‘...most likely, it's every man for himself. [...] And our
people are, as you might say, every man for himself, his own
business. Well, let's say, they’re more like wary competitors
than people who help each other.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
‘...the society, or it's hard to call it a society, the
population in Crimea is incredibly atomised. And I think it is
even more atomised now.’ (expert interview)
The study participants note that Crimean Tatars, unlike other ethnic groups in
Crimea, are very united and tend to help each other.
‘...a Crimean, an indigenous Crimean Tatar,
understands who a native Crimean Tatar is by looking at
him. They are united. The Crimean Tatar people are united...
I can't say if it’s the same for Russians and Ukrainians living
in Crimea. But the Crimean Tatars will never be left without
food or housing. Never.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents, Crimean Tatar)
The Russian occupation administration in Crimea prohibit civic activism, except
for officially approved or completely apolitical issues. Residents of Crimea say that
many cultural events are held there and that youth movements inspired by the Russian
occupation administration are flourishing.
‘Well, of course, there are some concerts and
exhibitions, but they are, well, as far as I can see, not
protesting, you know? Well, they are either neutral or, on the
contrary, kind of glorifying it... the concerts are held to earn
money... They earn their salary, they hold some thematic
evenings there, but it is not political.’ (in-depth interviews
with Crimean residents)
‘We have a lot of youth movements now, but they are
all, as they are called, the Young Guard, something like that,
some student groups appear. But they all go in the same
direction [...] I mean, there seem to be a lot of them, but I
don't understand what they do except, again, propaganda.’
(in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
‘...ideologically, it is very, very dangerous to hold
events publicly, It is now actually focused on, for example,
environmental issues, animal rescue, fighting against
landfills, things like that.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
59
Culture and, to a lesser extent, sport and charity (for example, fundraising for
medical treatment, restoration of architectural monuments, and construction of a
mosque) have become a safe space for self-organisation and public activity for the
pro-Ukrainian community and Crimean Tatars. However, even cultural figures can
become the focus of attention of Russian special services and are forced to conduct
their activities very carefully.
‘This is the unfortunately the case for those who are
supporters of Ukraine, to a greater or even minimal extent.
They have almost no opportunity, even if they organise
certain activities, they are not allowed to demonstrate that
this activity has any association with Ukraine. The maximum
that it can be is just that, that we’re just, that it’s culture, we
are just there, very carefully and on the edge, at the
boundary. This is a result of the constant communication
with some FSB officers or the Centre for Countering
Extremism, they are all at their pencils, they are all working
as if they are looking into microscopes, unfortunately. But I
am one of those who, during all the years of occupation, now
believe that the work [of those making events related to
Ukraine] is invaluable, as it should be. Because I have been
to such events, I know first-hand what a strong influence
they have on preserving a normal set of values, on
identification.’ (expert interview)
‘...the Crimean Tatars have completely dedicated
themselves to the cultural aspect. This is the only place
where they can express their identity, interests, pain, and
expectations. That's why there are so many initiatives and
organisations aimed at creating, I don't know, literary
evenings. I'm not talking about festivals, but there are
several events. We have a lot of poets and writers. This is
the trend in the cultural sphere. There is almost nothing left,
well, there are some charitable organisations, this kind of
activism.’ (expert interview)
Crimean Tatar experts and research participants also talked about various
forms of public resistance to the Russian occupation:
● attempts to obtain information from Ukrainian sources;
● attempts to restore and preserve Ukrainian documents;
● the tradition of Crimean Tatars to celebrate successful strikes by the AFU on
targets in Crimea together over evening coffee;
● publishing videos or stories about the negative aspects of life in Crimea;
60
● taking photos of Ukrainian symbols against the background of well-known
Crimean objects and publishing these photos on social media;
● throwing leaflets and creating pro-Ukrainian graffiti, hanging Ukrainian flags;
● disseminating information amongst Crimean residents on the possibilities for
realising the right to education in Ukraine;
● holding public events on the territory of the mainland part of Ukraine dedicated
to the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people from Crimea;
● publishing information in the media that hinders the Russian occupation
administration, such as UN reports on the violations of the rights of Ukrainian
citizens in Crimea;
● collecting personal data of people who are actively engaging in repression and
mobilisation activities in Crimea and are involved in collaboration activities;
● collecting and transferring donations to the territory of the mainland part of
Ukraine to help the AFU;
● detecting Russian military facilities and passing information about them to
special services in Ukraine.
The experts listed resistance movements such as Yellow Ribbon, Liberate
Crimea, The Fighting Seagulls, and Atesh.
61
3.3. Attitudes of residents of Crimea and the mainland part
of Ukraine towards each other
3.3.1. Situation of Crimean Tatars in mainland Ukraine
According to one expert, the situation of Crimean Tatars living in mainland
Ukraine is complicated by the problem of obtaining Ukrainian documents, especially
for those who did not have them before the occupation of Crimea in 2014. The process
of receiving or confirming citizenship rights is lengthy and complicated, which creates
additional difficulties for this community.
‘I've already told you that it depends on whether they
have Ukrainian documents. Because if they manage to get
Ukrainian documents, they are in the same situation as other
citizens of Ukraine, but with the only nuance that they have
lost their historical homeland. [...] However, those who do
not have documents are in a different situation. They are
worse off, and we must do a lot of work here. Unfortunately,
Ukraine has not yet developed an adequate algorithm to
confirm Ukrainian citizenship or their right to obtain
Ukrainian citizenship. In particular, by obtaining documents
from the archives of the countries where they were
deported. And there is still work to be done because today's
mechanism is very time-consuming. This is especially true
for those who, for example, were not yet 16 years old at the
time of the occupation, I mean, as of February 2014, because
they would receive their first passport at age 16. And they
lived, for example, under occupation, and now they are
trying to go to the controlled territory of Ukraine to get their
first documents and then build their lives either in Ukraine
or go abroad to study or live abroad or something else.’
(expert interview)
Experts also note the language barrier problem: many Crimean Tatars do not
speak Ukrainian, as it was not widespread in their places of residence (including
Crimea). This complicates their integration into Ukrainian society.
‘None of them knew Ukrainian. Because it was not
used in the places where they were. When they returned to
Crimea, they also did not hear this Ukrainian language very
much, so they did not consider themselves to be part of the
Ukrainian community. This is my impression. This does not
mean that they did not learn it, they tried where there was
62
such an opportunity, but let's be honest, there was not much
opportunity to learn Ukrainian in Crimea.’ (expert interview)
Crimean Tatars themselves are more optimistic about the attitude of mainland
Ukrainians towards them.
‘People here [in Kyiv] expressed interest when I
arrived. Even before, when people from other regions of
Ukraine came to Crimea, children in summer camps there
were interested... And I realised I wanted to tell them
something, to familiarise them [with Crimea], and establish
some connections. And that's how we live. In other words,
in any new group of people, when you join, they immediately
ask you questions, and you start telling them something.
And here it is perceived very positively and with great
interest.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
One of the experts also points out that despite all the difficulties that Crimean
Tatars faced after forced moving to mainland Ukraine, they have the opportunity to
present themselves and their culture to the entire Ukrainian society.
‘This is also an emotionally difficult period because of
the separation of people, including families, friends, and the
environment. This is a state of opportunity to demonstrate
Crimean Tatar culture and Crimean Tatar identity here for
Ukrainians who are discovering Crimean Tatars today, this
is an important element.’ (expert interview).
3.3.2. Attitudes of the mainland part of Ukraine residents towards
Crimean residents
Of all eight categories of Ukrainians (from the list offered to the respondents),
no more than 19% said they have a negative attitude towards the other groups. This
means that most Ukrainians have good or at least neutral attitudes towards IDPs,
refugees abroad, Ukrainians under temporary occupation, and Russian-speaking
citizens.
At the same time, attitudes towards different categories are unequal, and the
attitudes still have a specific hierarchy. For example, Ukrainians have the best attitude
towards Crimean residents who moved to government-controlled territories after the
full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (77% have a good attitude towards them). In
addition, most Ukrainians have a good attitude towards IDPs (73%), Crimean Tatars
(63%), and Ukrainians living under temporary occupation in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and
63
Kherson Oblasts (63%). At the same time, another 19-26% have a neutral attitude
towards these categories, and only 1-3% have a bad attitude towards them.
In addition to a direct question about attitudes towards specific categories, the
survey examined attitudes towards Ukrainians living under occupation using the
Bogardus scale (adapted)4
. KIIS has considerable experience researching social
distance (primarily in interethnic relations, but also about other groups of society) using
the Bogardus scale5
.
For each group on the list, respondents have to answer how close they are
willing to be with representatives of each group. This is called social distance. The
minimum social distance is 1 (I agree to let them in as a family member), and the
maximum is 7 (I would not let them into Ukraine). The level of social distance is often
interpreted as prejudice against a particular group. N. Panina and E. Golovakha
4 More information about the Bogardus scale can be found in this publication. Gorbachyk, O. (2005).
Testing the Validity of the Bogardus Scale for Measuring Interethnic Tolerance in Ukraine. Scientific
notes of NaUKMA. Volume 46. Sociological sciences.
https://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/server/api/core/bitstreams/2caf07c7-47fd-44dc-9436-
17df422e4e19/content
5 KIIS has considerable experience in researching social distance (primarily in the area of interethnic
relations, but also in relation to other groups of society), for example, ‘Interethnic Prejudice in Ukraine:
October 2023’ // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1364&page=1 or ‘Attitudes
towards Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, Russian-speaking Citizens and Some Other
Categories of the Population of Ukraine’
//https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=1218&page=1
64
believe that values less than 4.0 indicate openness (tolerance), and values from 4 to 5
indicate separation.
So, first, in the case of all three population groups - Ukrainians living under
occupation in Crimea / in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts / Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and
Kherson Oblasts - the average value ranges from 2.8 to 3.4 (for comparison, openness
to ‘Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians’ is 2). This indicates a relatively low distance to all
groups, i.e. Ukrainians are mainly open to relatively close relations with Ukrainians who
were forced to live under temporary occupation regardless of the specific territory.
Second, a particular hierarchy is again evident. Respondents are ‘closest’ to
residents of Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Kherson Oblasts (2.8). This is followed by the
residents of Crimea (3.1) and the relatively lowest indicator for residents of Donetsk
and Luhansk Oblasts (3.4). For context, similar indicators of social distance (2.9-3.4)
in another KIIS survey were traced to Poles, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Canadians,
Americans, Germans, French, and Jews.
At the same time, there is some tension between Ukrainians living in the
mainland part of Ukraine and Crimea. The focus group participants who are Ukrainian
citizens and are not Crimean Tatars verbalise this in the form of insults and pretences
towards the inhabitants of the peninsula.
‘In 2014, it was, probably, a symbol of betrayal for me
that Crimea, during such a difficult time, left us. Many of my
friends were living in Crimea in 2014, and I talked to them at
that time, and I was shocked, to be honest: everyone there
was waiting for Russia. Well, not all of them, but my friends
from my institute who lived there were, and it was at the
same time, a disappointment, and such a betrayal. Even the
position of the Crimean Tatars inspired me more than the
person with whom I lived in the dormitory, in the same
room.’ (focus group with non-Crimean Tatar residents of
Ukraine)
During the focus group discussions, respondents expressed that most Crimean
residents are forced to live under temporary occupation because they cannot leave
their homes for various reasons. After 2022, some participants in the study became
more interested in the history of Crimea and expressed sympathy for the residents who
remain under occupation. However, two participants from the western region of
Ukraine noted that the full-scale invasion had changed their attitude towards those who
remained in Crimea to a more negative one. They explained this, saying that they did
not understand how people could choose to stay under occupation and be exposed to
Russian propaganda.
65
3.3.2. Attitudes of Crimean residents towards the residents of the
mainland part of Ukraine
The in-depth interview respondents who live in Crimea have a positive
association with Ukraine and characterise it as the country where they spent most of
their childhood and youth. Some of them expressed regret over the events that Ukraine
is going through. At the same time, two respondents hinted that Ukraine was to blame
for the war with Russia, avoiding direct wording.
‘[These associations,] it's naturally what I learned at
school. We called it, at first, the Ukrainian language, then our
native language, the Ukrainian literature that I studied.
Poems come to mind. “I was 13 years old and herding lambs
outside the village, either the sun was shining, or I was
imagining it” … I remember the poems, naturally, with
warmth. After all, this is where I lived, the country where I
lived for 18 years, and that’s most of my life.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents)
‘This is a country where I lived for most of my life, and
there was no doubt, censorship or whatever, well, at least in
our family, or disagreement with the decision that Crimea
was handed over to Ukraine. I don't know, it's in the order of
things and the norm.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
‘I don't think anything bad about Ukraine at all. We
lived there long enough, we worked there, and we have
partners there in Kyiv. Well, if I were to say what my first
association is, it's a pity that it all turned out like this—pity's
kind of my first association. There is no hatred. Well, there
is pity, but it seems to me that the Ukrainian side is more to
blame for behaving this way. They should have somehow
used the multi-vector approach that Leonid Kuchma talked
about. That is, the first association is pity. Pity, regret that
this happened.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean residents)
‘...when I think of Ukraine, I immediately have a
yellow-blue colour in mind, Kyiv, the Dnipro, walks in April,
with chestnuts in bloom. Delicious food... Ukraine, for me,
has always been freedom. And this is not only my feeling,
when we even travelled from Crimea to Ukraine, here in the
north, from the north of Crimea to Kherson Oblast, and we
passed these two borders, everyone always said that on the
Russian side, you stand so nervously. And you pass the
Kherson side, and when you see this cloud on the Kherson
66
side, you literally exhale.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
Respondents believe that residents of the mainland part of Ukraine have
different attitudes towards Crimean residents. Some of them keep in touch with their
friends in Ukraine. The full-scale war has significantly deteriorated interpersonal
relations and negatively affected the attitudes of mainland Ukrainians towards
Crimeans. Two participants expressed the opinion that Ukrainians have a negative
attitude towards Crimean residents and consider Crimeans to be traitors.
‘I have a lot of friends in Ukraine now, with whom I
communicate daily. Their cities are often hit by rockets, and
I am worried about them. I am interested in their well-being,
health and so on. And from what I hear from my friends, they
think very positively about me, my friends, and my
surroundings… I would like, as you said, to tell the people
of Ukraine that you are a very strong, courageous and
resilient people. And sooner or later, I am sure you can come
to the Black Sea coast, rest with your families, meet your
relatives, and so on.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
‘In all different ways. I have friends; I had a friend
when the war started, and she stopped communicating with
me completely. ...Well, what do you think? Maybe I made this
war happen, and I can stop it. Well, if I were to go to the city
square [to protest], would my sacrifice help? If it would stop
the war, I would go... not everything depends on us. If
something depended on me...’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
‘...they believe that we betrayed them. That's why I
once had, like I say now, I had partners before. Now we are
not socialising with each other. Well, it doesn't work... we
are considered traitors by the people of Ukraine. Well, at
least, by those with whom I have communicated.’ (in-depth
interviews with Crimean residents)
‘In different ways. I know different opinions. Some
people are critical and say that everyone should have left.
Some people believe that ‘this is home, they are waiting
there, they will help us there.’ (in-depth interviews with
Crimean residents)
67
3.4. Factors of unification between the mainland part of Ukraine
and Crimea
According to residents of the mainland part of Ukraine who are not Crimean
Tatars, a level of understanding between the populations of Crimea and the mainland
part of Ukraine is theoretically possible. Still, it will not be easy or quick. Finding things
in common after de-occupation will take time, even years or decades, and it is unlikely
that pro-Russian Crimeans will ever be able to find common ground with mainland
Ukrainians.
‘...reconciliation and understanding will come, but we
should not expect it to come quickly. It will take at least one
or even two generations, and only the next generations will
find common ground when no such pronounced personal
emotions and traumatic experiences exist. There will be just
an intellectual understanding of why these people did this
and why those people did that. I believe that this will happen
over time.’ (focus group with non-Crimean Tatar residents of
Ukraine)
Young residents in the South of Ukraine noted that the South and East of
Ukraine, unlike the West, will understand Crimean residents better because of their
shared historical experience with Russification. Some representatives of the Western
region, on the other hand, believed that in the West of Ukraine, the local population
finds it more difficult to accept people who have lived under Russian occupation for a
long time.
‘...I am in western Ukraine, and I believe that if the
local population finds out that the Muscovites, as they say,
who lived under the occupiers and bowed to the occupier,
have come here, then they will not be accepted here. I am
100% sure that people here will say and think everything and
anything bad about them. If they find out that those people
sold their souls, as someone said here, and lived on those
pensions or social benefits... I think that’s just how our
region is. In eastern Ukraine, I think they would be accepted
faster.’ (focus group with non-Crimean Tatar residents of
Ukraine)
The factors that could unite Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, according to some
respondents, could be:
● The perception of Russia as a common enemy (meaning for Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars):
68
‘If we are talking about the current situation, then in
this case, I see only unification in the fact that we have a
common enemy with these Ukrainian Tatars, who suffered a
lot from the Soviet Union, but we know who was in charge
in the Soviet Union for the most part.’ (focus group with
residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
● Crimea's need for water and electricity from the mainland part of Ukraine and
for communication with the mainland through a land corridor:
‘You know the story that Khrushchev gave Crimea to
Ukraine not because Ukraine wanted it so badly, but
because Crimea could not survive independently. Water
from Ukraine will be vital, communication through the land
corridor is critical, electricity is important, and so on.’ (focus
group with residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
● A common vision of the future and a shared desire for the best:
‘...what could unite us is some kind of vision of the
common future. To be together with each other and see a
common future. There must be a common understanding. Of
course, I understand that people are all different, everyone
has their own views and opinions, but most people need to
perceive the right idea and go in one direction.’ (focus group
with residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
● Desire for European integration to achieve a higher standard of living:
‘...the idea of European integration, but it has to be
real European integration. It should be a high level of socioeconomic development and a high standard of living, and
not what happened in our country when officials gave
themselves 50-100 thousand Hryvnia salaries, that is, they
made some kind of personal European integration within
their circle. At the same time, the people’s standard of living
remained the same or even decreased from what it was
before 2014. There should be real development, not simply
declared development.’ (focus group with residents of
Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
● Restoration of historical justice:
‘I think that restoring, again, historical justice and
further economic prosperity are the most compatible topics
for Ukraine and the people of Crimea. Both for the future, as
well as for the present.’ (focus group with non-Crimean Tatar
residents of Ukraine)
69
To reduce the likelihood and intensity of conflicts, focus group participants
suggested:
● To pursue a competent information policy:
‘Whoever invests money, knowledge, and experience
in information, wins. Therefore, there will be no
understanding without competent propaganda, competent
information, and some convincing arguments.’ (focus group
with residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
● To strengthen the rights and opportunities of Crimean Tatars, up to the transfer
of governance over the peninsula to them:
‘If there is some kind of de-occupation in Crimea in
the future, it's just hard to talk about it now in our current
conditions. I think it would be right to make a moratorium on
voting for those who were under occupation in Crimea for a
certain period. Unlike in Latvia, when these people simply
do not vote for ten years, for example. So, who will represent
this autonomy? It would be right and fair for the Mejlis itself
to represent it. Why the Mejlis? Because the Mejlis have not
betrayed us, it is banned, and no matter how you say it, in
principle, the Tatars are a separate people, but they know
that we are their allies, and we support them. Therefore, let
the Crimean parliament transfer power to the Mejlis. Let ten
years pass. And then some general elections will be held
there, and there will be, for example, two chambers in this
parliament.’ (focus group with non-Crimean Tatar residents
of Ukraine)
● Avoid sensitive issues such as national holidays and national heroes;
● Create a free economic zone in Crimea:
‘It seems to me that Crimea should be a kind of free
economic zone. Economic cooperation is somehow a
peaceful platform for understanding and reconciliation.
Crimea is a different region in terms of economy. When I
worked in a bank, the Crimean branches worked completely
differently. The economy there is completely different; the
people are completely different. We need to make
cooperation as profitable as possible, and people will
cooperate there based on economic interaction. There will
be some points of reconciliation. There will be some kind of
cooperation with our southern regions. The vegetables
[there] could be delivered to Crimea, where there is a real
70
problem with growing them.’ (focus group with non-Crimean
Tatar residents of Ukraine)
● Cultivate respect for human rights, linguistic and religious identity:
‘When I was studying, when I had many friends from
Crimea and representatives of national minorities, we all
found common ground during our long stay together, that
we all have the same rights. We all have some kind of
ethnicity, and we have every right to express it freely and to
respect the rights of another person and not to offend them.
These are the only common points we can have.’ (focus
group with non-Crimean Tatar residents of Ukraine)
71
4. Reintegration of Crimea
4.1 Current perception of the situation in Crimea by residents of
the mainland part of Ukraine
Most respondents believe that Crimea should eventually return to Ukraine's
control (90% vs. 7.5% disagree) and that the Crimean Peninsula is the homeland of
the indigenous Crimean Tatar people (86% vs. 11% disagree). In addition, 94% reject
the thesis that Crimea has always been Russian and has an exclusively Russian past.
The other two statements demonstrate a more significant variation of opinions. Thus,
59% agree with the argument that the Crimean Khanate is part of the history of the
formation of Ukrainian statehood, whilst 28% disagree. Regarding the statement that
Crimea has resisted the occupation for all ten years, 43% agree, and 49% disagree.
4.2. Perceptions of the future of Crimea
4.2.1. Importance and possibility of de-occupation of Crimea
Although 9 out of 10 Ukrainians support the return of Crimea to Ukraine's
control, when asked about the importance of de-occupying the peninsula, 55% said it
was very important to them personally. For 19%, it is rather important, and for 24%, it
is rather unimportant or not at all important. Indirect evidence of the importance of this
issue and the willingness of Ukrainians to sacrifice certain benefits for the sake of
Crimea is that the vast majority of respondents believe that after de-occupation, the
peninsula should become an essential area of financial support from the state (83%)
and that business benefits should be introduced (79%). Only 14% and 17% of
respondents do not support these initiatives.
72
At the same time, 45% of respondents believe Crimea could be de-occupied in
the next five years, and another 37% expect it in the distant future. On the other hand,
13% are sceptical about the possibility of returning the peninsula at all, and only 6%
believe it is absolutely impossible.
For younger respondents, the de-occupation of Crimea is less important, and
they have less faith in achieving it in the short term. Whilst 65% of respondents aged
60+ consider the de-occupation of the peninsula to be very important for them, this
figure drops to 42% amongst young people aged 18-29. Regarding the belief in the
possibility of de-occupation in the next five years, amongst older respondents (60+),
this figure is 53%, whilst amongst younger respondents (18-29 years old), it drops to
22%. At the same time, few young people do not believe in the possibility of deoccupation - they are likelier to talk about a distant future.
73
4.2.2. Political and administrative status of Crimea and Sevastopol after
de-occupation
Crimea's political and administrative status after de-occupation is one of the
most critical factors for its future. Still, neither Ukrainian society nor experts have a fully
consolidated position. According to the quantitative survey, 39% of respondents
support the return of Crimea to its pre-war status as an Autonomous Republic within
Ukraine. However, almost the same number (37%) favour Crimea becoming an
ordinary oblast of Ukraine. Another 20% of respondents believe that the peninsula
should become a national-territorially autonomous, led by Crimean Tatars. These data
emphasise society's significant polarisation regarding Crimea's future status, where
opinions are divided between three main options. Opinions are similarly divided on the
status of Sevastopol: 52% of respondents believe that the city's special status should
be preserved, whilst 40% are against it.
74
Ukrainians are generally not sufficiently informed about the Crimean Tatars'
aspirations to establish national-territorial autonomy in Crimea. According to the polls,
23% of respondents have not heard anything about this initiative and do not understand
its essence. Only 17% are well aware and fully understand the issue. Another 26%
have heard something but cannot explain its essence, and 34% have not heard about
it but have some idea what it might be about.
At the same time, most respondents to the quantitative survey (64%) support
the creation of Crimean Tatar national-territorial autonomy, whilst 29% oppose it and
7% have not decided on the issue. It should be noted that, considering the answers to
the previous question about the level of awareness of the creation of Crimean Tatar
national-territorial autonomy, these data should be interpreted with caution. The results
may change during a full-fledged socio-political discussion and an increase in public
awareness of this issue.
One of the experts points out that this issue is not being addressed at the
government level because it is a delicate topic.
‘I’m thinking about the law on the status of the
Crimean Tatar people, I mean the preparation, resumption of
75
the work of the Constitutional Commission on the status of
Crimea and the Crimean Tatar people, in general, they are
very afraid of this topic, what will happen to Crimean
autonomy, in what form it will be, and the status of
Sevastopol.
This discussion does not exist today because it is
very painful. Some people think, and they may be right, that
it is not needed, that what is required now is cohesion, not
discussions that will shake up society. I agree, but it doesn't
mean the people who need to be engaged in this topic,
shouldn't be. They should do their work quietly, without
outbursts of emotion in the public space, but they need to
prepare, study and think about how this can be done.’
(expert interview)
Amongst experts, as well as amongst ordinary respondents, views on the
status of Crimea after de-occupation depend very much on their ethnicity: experts
amongst the Crimean Tatars are more likely to support national-territorial Crimean
Tatar autonomy or autonomy for all indigenous peoples of Ukraine, whilst other experts
discuss a more comprehensive range of possibilities. The respondents - Crimean
Tatars living in Crimea - consider the results of the creation of national-territorial
autonomy to include the return of Crimean Tatar names for places, granting official
status to Crimean Tatar holidays, the creation of Crimean Tatar schools, the
construction of mosques, etc:
‘...I would like to see Crimea as a part of Ukraine so
that my people would have more power. Perhaps even its
own autonomy... I would like to see, I remember this word
now, that our elders, let's say, Mustafa Dzhemilev, Refat
Chubarov and so on, these are the main politicians of the
Crimean Tatar people, that they were given more power to
do what they think and want to do in Crimea. Naturally, I want
to return the names of Crimean Tatar cities and the names
of Crimean Tatar villages. I would like our holidays to be
more official, so to speak, so that our holidays also have
official days off and so on... To create Crimean Tatar schools
or restore the ones there, naturally, to a greater extent. So,
a mosque could be built in every village with 200-300 people
or more.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean residents,
Crimean Tatar)
Participants in focus groups with non-Crimean Tatar residents of Ukraine are
far from being unanimous on this issue. As in the quantitative study, opinions were
voiced in support of all the options for the status of Crimea that circulate in the public
76
space. Crimea holding the status as an oblast of Ukraine was described by
respondents in focus groups with non-Crimean Tatar residents of Ukraine as the safest
option after de-occupation. As for the sentiments of Crimean residents, which we
cannot assess with a quantitative survey, one expert believes that preferences for
certain options on the peninsula depend very much on the ethnic and ideological group.
‘Crimean Tatars see it as national-territorial
autonomy. I think pro-Ukrainian residents partly do see it as
just an oblast. Pro-Russian residents do not even consider
this.’ (expert interview)
One of the experts made the following argument against preserving Crimea's
status after de-occupation as an autonomous republic or an ordinary oblast: since, in
his opinion, the population of Crimea will be mostly pro-Russian, the elected local
governments (regardless of the region's status) will pursue their own identity policy. He
sees the creation of Crimean Tatar national-territorial autonomy as a counterweight.
Some experts believe that the key factor in Crimea's future administrativeterritorial structure, which will ease the potential conflict between supporters of the
peninsula's autonomy (in its various forms) and those who oppose it, is the successful
implementation of decentralisation.
‘I see the future of Crimea very positively. We will be
able to effectively implement the decentralisation reform
there, which may or may not exacerbate the issue of
autonomy because autonomy is not a panacaea. Autonomy
may even play a negative role for the Crimean Tatars. There
are cases when the status of autonomy negatively affects
the status of the indigenous people, de facto their socioeconomic opportunities, their opportunities for inclusion.’
(expert interview)
4.2.3. Economic and infrastructural future of Crimea
This topic was most often mentioned by experts, some of whom believe that
after the de-occupation of Crimea, the peninsula will face significant infrastructural and
economic problems, especially if the liberation of Crimea is carried out through warfare.
It was also pointed out that the actions of the occupation administration have already
damaged the peninsula's infrastructure capabilities.
‘Why? Because they destroyed the water supply in
Crimea. The blowing up of the Kakhovka hydroelectric
power station and the destruction of the canal - well, I don't
know how many years it will take to get it all up and running
again. I don't know. And now, well, I don't know how much it
77
will take to restore the power supply and the fibre optics
necessary for the Internet.’ (expert interview)
4.2.4. Demographic Future of Crimea
Experts suggest that the de-occupation of Crimea, no matter how it happens,
will lead to dramatic demographic changes. One expert describes the mechanism of
these changes as follows. First, Russians who settled in Crimea after 2014 will leave
the peninsula. Secondly, possible infrastructural and economic problems may
encourage young people to emigrate from Crimea (and even move outside Ukraine).
‘That's why Crimea will go through a challenging
economic period. And this will lead to the fact that some
young people will leave Crimea. They will get Ukrainian
passports with a visa-free regime and go somewhere else.
The fact that there will be certain demographic shifts is
certain. The fact that the “newcomers” will leave, they will
leave for the most part. Well, you know, that's how we will
deport them. I'm sure that they will leave for some reason.
And Crimea will need to look for its new economic model in
terms of the conditions in which it will be.’ (expert interview)
4.2.5. How the future of Crimea is covered in Telegram channels on the
peninsula
According to the results of media monitoring, pro-Russian Telegram channels
are actively covering events and issues related to Crimea's future, trying to consolidate
a positive narrative in the information space about the peninsula's integration into the
Russian Federation after the attempted annexation. Special attention is paid to
infrastructure development, social programmes, and support from the occupying
federal government. At the same time, pro-Russian Telegram channels emphasise
threats from Ukraine and the West, presenting them as challenges to stability in the
region.
A significant part of the information space is also occupied by pro-Ukrainian
channels discussing the return of Crimea to Ukrainian control. They emphasise the
illegality of the attempted annexation, human rights violations, and the negative
consequences for the Crimean population due to the actions of the Russian occupation
administration. These channels often highlight international support for Ukraine and
consider possible scenarios for de-occupation.
4.3. Structure and organisation of power in a de-occupied
Crimea
One of the foremost expert recommendations on the organisation of power in
the de-occupied Crimea is that the Ukrainian authorities should be organisationally,
78
methodologically, and legally ready to govern Crimea on the ground right now, rather
than addressing these issues in the future.
‘And here, it is necessary for the Ukrainian legislation
to be ready for certain actions. The first and most important
stage is to develop Ukrainian legislation now so that it is
ready, because we will demonstrate, we need to
demonstrate, that Ukraine is a state governed by the rule of
law, that it acts following the laws of Ukraine, the
Constitution of Ukraine and international law. And here we
need all these legislative acts to be adopted so everyone
responsible for reintegrating Crimea has the tools to do so.’
(expert interview)
Experts believe that in the first year(s), the mechanism of local self-government
in Crimea will not work through elections, and the military administration or similar
temporary power structures will have all the power.
‘We must be honest, there will be no elections in the
first years. There won’t be any... In the first year, especially,
it will be a military administration, a commandant's office,
measures to cleanse the government, and it is also
necessary to talk about it... There will be deportations of
people who illegally entered the territory, in principle, the
territory of Crimea. And over the years, we will talk about all
this, and Ukrainian politicians, well, of Crimean origin, let's
say, will be in the loop.’ (expert interview)
Crimean Tatar experts believe that in the first stages after de-occupation, local
national self-government bodies should be restored, and representatives of these
bodies, as well as the Mejlis, should participate in the work of the interim military-civilian
administration of Crimea.
‘We propose, for example, that if we cannot hold
elections in the first years, we can hold elections to the
[national congress,] the Qurultay. Because the Crimean
Tatars are tiny nation, we all practically know each other.
And here, when we will be in the first year [after deoccupation], we will need to restore all the local national
self-government bodies, which will primarily assist the civilmilitary administration in reintegration issues. And during
this period, whilst the military-civilian administration is
working with the help of local national self-government
bodies and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, it will be
possible to train local people who will continue to participate
in all these political processes and build a pro-Ukrainian
Crimea.’ (expert interview)
79
4.3.1 Organisation of Community Governance and Elections after Deoccupation
The respondents were almost equally divided on the issue of organising
community management in Crimea after de-occupation: 47% believe that the
leadership of communities should be appointed by the President, the Government or
local military-civilian administrations, whilst the same number (47%) support holding
elections.
Regarding the timing of local elections, almost half of the respondents (44.5%)
gave a ‘diplomatic’ answer that they should take place only after the security situation
is fully restored. At the same time, 40% of respondents are already ready for
conditionally ‘quick’ elections - either within a year or immediately after the end of
martial law. Only 13% are inclined to mention a more distant date (in 2-4 years or more
than five years). According to KIIS research for the NDI, for Ukrainians, ‘free and fair
elections’ are one of the three critical aspects of a fully functioning democracy6
. In
6 Ukraine's support for NATO and demand for inclusive democracy reach record highs//
https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1255&page=1
80
addition, over 90% constantly express their desire for Ukraine to remain a democratic
state. Perhaps the data on the timing of the elections indicate that, despite the ongoing
occupation, respondents believe that democratic procedures should be maintained.
Therefore, it remains essential to develop a format in which the expression of the will
of citizens will be preserved, but in a safe environment for the peninsula and the
country as a whole.
4.3.2. Restrictions on the voting rights of citizens living in the occupied
territories
The issue of restricting the voting rights of citizens who lived under occupation
is controversial without a clear consensus. Thus, 47% believe there should be fiveyear restrictions on the ability to elect the Verkhovna Rada and the President, although
the same number (49%) oppose such restrictions. At the same time, in the case of the
right to run for the presidency or the Verkhovna Rada, 59% support such restrictions,
but a significant share (38%) opposes them. This indicates a severe division of society
as to how the issue of voting rights of citizens under occupation should be addressed.
On the one hand, restrictions can be seen as a means of security and stabilisation of
the political situation. On the other hand, it can be criticised for violating fundamental
democratic rights and potentially dividing people into ‘us’ and ‘them’.
4.3.3 Quotas in government for Crimean Tatars
Although a significant number of Ukrainians have a critical view of these issues,
in general, the majority supports both quotas for the Crimean Tatar people in local
governments in Crimea (70% versus 22% who do not) and quotas for the Crimean
Tatar and other indigenous peoples in the Verkhovna Rada (63% versus 32%).
It is worth noting that the wording of the quota in the Verkhovna Rada
emphasised the Crimean Tatar people. The attitude towards other indigenous peoples
will likely differ depending on the people in question.
81
4.4. Collaborationism
4.4.1 Lack of clear policy and communication on collaborationism
The issue of collaborationism in Crimea, its legal definition, the lack of
consistency in approaches to this problem, and communication on collaborationism
with Crimean residents who now live in the occupied territory are amongst the most
challenging issues related to the reintegration of the peninsula. The study participants,
experts, and ordinary citizens believe that the approach to defining collaborationism is
not discussed in the public space, which negatively affects the attitude of Crimeans
towards de-occupation. For example, a respondent living in occupied Crimea points
out that even pro-Ukrainian residents of the peninsula fear persecution after deoccupation:
‘I'm distraught that when Ukraine comes, my family
.... And I won't be able to get them out of here, and I won't be
able to whitewash them there or justify them there. There is
no chance. And I am very worried that my mother will be
punished, in my opinion, for nothing. She made some wrong
decisions, but in my opinion, for example, when you go to
the “Myrotvorets” website, then my mother is a saboteur
who will be imprisoned for the rest of her life, and the people
who were the faces of this so-called ‘Crimean Spring’ will
just come to court and that’s it. That is, Sergey Aksyonov,
Vladimir Konstantinov, Natalia Poklonskaya - these people
82
were squeezing Crimea out with their hands... They are not
saboteurs from Ukraine's point of view. I mean, this
surprises me very much.’ (in-depth interviews with Crimean
residents)
Both the experts who are Crimean Tatars and those who are not have
highlighted the importance of the Ukrainian authorities' consistency, unambiguity of
policy, and communication on the issue of collaborationism. Like ordinary Crimean
residents in occupation, the experts emphasise that uncertainty about collaborationism
makes the prospects for de-occupation very threatening for many segments of the
Crimean population in occupation.
‘It is imperative to send clear, non-contradictory
messages, at least in terms of principles. Because I have not
seen this consistency until recently. I received this message
from Crimea: ‘Man, we're scared’. I'm pleased about the
prospect of Ukraine's return, and all of this is terrible, but
still, I'm even scared, conditionally, of businessmen and
entrepreneurs who have registered a business and
registered new property, which, you know, he received and
for which he paid. This is also a difficult moment for many
people because they pay taxes and they understand where,
amongst other things, these taxes go. They are worried
about all this and think: ‘What will happen to us?.’ (expert
interview)
‘Why am I talking right now about dispelling myths
and fears? Because the main fear about the Ukrainian state
is, what will happen to us? When reintegration takes place,
what will happen to us? And we cannot start any cognitive
reintegration unless we will be able to get rid of these fears.
This is not the case today. Developing a very
understandable state policy about people’s fears will be
necessary. Because for them, the Ukrainian state and the
state institutions of Ukraine are now those that want to come
and punish them. This is the myth. And there can be no
cognitive de-occupation until we destroy these myths and
these fears.’ (expert interview)
Experts believe that the communication work on explaining the issue of
collaborationism to the Crimean population has not been sufficiently conducted to date:
‘First of all, we have to influence the general
population so that they better understand what to be afraid
of and what not to be afraid of. That is, via these legal
83
components of this legislation, and whether they will be
primarily against crimes, against this. From the start, we
need to work on a massive scale to influence a huge part of
the population, and then, of course, we need to work on
more local groups.’ (expert interview)
Some experts think that such work has not been done at all.
‘In ten years, we have not set a framework for
answering who a collaborator is.’ (expert interview)
However, a big problem is that even the experts do not have a clear
understanding of the approaches to the issue of collaborationism. Some participants
in the expert interviews admit that they do not currently understand what is legally
considered collaboration in Crimea and what is not, and cannot advise Crimeans who
remained on the peninsula.
‘Next, we need to have the same transparent, clear
state policy on collaboration. Because now I don't know
anything about it either. There is nothing. And when I talk to
my girlfriend, who works in a clinic, she says that when
Crimea is de-occupied, that she will be considered a
collaborator. Well, she works in the HR department. She is a
collaborator…I can’t really say. She works in an HR
department at a state institution. She hires and fires people
according to the Russian standard. So, is she a collaborator
or not? She doesn't know, and I don't know. It is necessary
to have a transparent and understandable transitional
justice policy.’ (expert interview)
The respondents to the expert study believe that mistakes have already been
made in the legislative definition of collaborationism, and Ukraine's policy has not been
consistent and clear. For example, certain economic activities in Crimea, which were
not banned after 2014, have been interpreted by legislative acts as collaborationism
since a certain moment in time.
‘And here, too, we must work very hard to detail
Article 111-3-1. What I mean are collaboration activities,
because if you take Crimea, then you could put all of Crimea
in jail. Because until 2022, all of this was allowed there. That,
which has now been prohibited, at this moment in time. This
is a big problem that is also caused by corruption.’ (expert
interview)
‘Collaborationism in the situation with Crimea is a
rather difficult issue. Why? For some time, the Ukrainian
84
legislation allowed certain actions, which today are
forbidden by the very same legislation, or not the same, but
Ukrainian legislation now recognises these actions as
collaboration. That is, in my understanding, unfortunately,
the Ukrainian government was inconsistent. First, let's talk
about collaborationism as an economic activity. In other
words, at first, they allowed it. And now, when I look at, let's
say, the procedural documents that are presented to
collaborators, there are references to the fact that a person
committed certain actions, a certain period, which at that
time were not recognised as, let's say, a violation of the law.’
(expert interview)
Crimean Tatar experts have their approach to the methodology for identifying
collaborators.
‘We need to formulate a policy today, and we have
actually developed something that, for example, the state
does not do. Back in 2019, we developed a methodology, as
we call it, to determine the degree of collaboration. That is,
every person who lives in Crimea, even if they are proUkrainian, can be considered a collaborator. But the degree
of collaboration when we are talking about a person who, for
example, ran around with a Russian flag, who went to the
so-called SMO, who received awards from the Russian
authorities [occupation administration – Ed.], who worked,
for instance, at a school or university and taught the history
of the Russian Federation and Crimea as part of the Russian
Federation. This is one of the questions, and we have a 12-
point system there.
On the other hand, when we talk about a person who
lived in Crimea, it is vital for us that pro-Ukrainian citizens
remain in Crimea. And it’s very important that all these
people were not socially active, in terms of pro-Russianism.
The people who score higher than 50% in our test have to
already be thinking that they may have problems with
Ukrainian legislation for their actions in Crimea.’ (expert
interview)
Both the participants of the focus group study (including both Crimean Tatars
living in Ukraine and other residents of Ukraine), and experts emphasised the
importance of the principle of an individual approach to the issue of collaborationism.
85
Such opinions are typical for representatives of all ethnicities, age groups, and regions
of Ukraine who participated in the study. One of the experts said:
‘I, for one, have my doubts if it’s the right thing to
reject case management, to choose not to look at each case
on an individual basis. One of the approaches to transitional
justice is to put people into groups and apply transitional
justice regarding collaborationism, group by group. For
example, we can choose to exempt a group of primary
school teachers from any responsibility and hold school
principals responsible by default. I'm not sure if that’s the
right thing to do, but I think there should be some kind of
individual approach. Because you won't find any universal
criteria.’ (expert interview)
‘This is one of the biggest problems, but it has to be a
case-by-case situation. That is, there can be no collective
responsibility here. A university professor training children
or students underground for ten years and developing
critical thinking is our ally. But the same teacher can simply
sow propaganda and hostility towards Ukraine. This is our
enemy. Therefore, it should be case by case. We must move
away from general international practices and group
policies, to more individual consideration for each person.’
(expert interview)
Participants in the focus group discussions expressed fears that mistakes in
decisions regarding collaboration would lay the foundation for a new conflict in Crimea
that would develop after de-occupation.
‘Well, I wouldn't apply anything to these people
because everyone has a different situation, you don't need
to apply everything... I think all these de-occupation
conditions are too strict. They could simply create some
prerequisite for a new war. The people whom…even the
same Crimeans, the Crimean Tatars…whom Stalin deported
in three nights in 1945, returned 50-60 years later and
claimed their rights. Well, with these harsh, too harsh
methods, I think some prerequisites for a new conflict will
be created. I mean, like in the First World War, Germany lost,
and wild reparations besieged it. As a result, Hitler came
along and said “we will restore Germany's power”, and
again, it all started again in a second round. This, I think, is
the risk of being too tough. It can simply lead to laying the
86
groundwork for a future conflict.’ (focus group with nonCrimean Tatar residents of Ukraine)
Experts see significant risks in the process of identifying those involved in
collaboration activities, as the testimonies of Crimeans that will be collected by
Ukrainian law enforcement officers may be false and aimed at revenge for personal
insults or conflicts.
‘Again, when hearing testimonies, it must be
understood that people are different. Therefore, after
Ukraine de-occupies territory, there will be a lot of people
who will just point fingers and say some absurd things.
Therefore, there should be a well-thought-out strategy for
conducting investigative actions, identifying these
collaborators, collecting this relevant evidence, and
documenting and evaluating it.’ (expert interview)
The results of the study demonstrate that Ukraine should communicate that the
residents of Crimea are Ukrainians, not traitors or collaborators. This will relieve the
tension that Russia is fuelling by claiming that Ukraine considers all Crimeans to be
enemies. It is essential to define who is a collaborator, on what grounds, and for what
actions they are liable, in order to avoid the image of a ‘punisher’. The communication
should show that the AFU is liberating Ukrainians, not punishing them. Some experts
believe that the government's ill-conceived communication about collaboration in
occupied Crimea not only creates a sense of uncertainty, fear, and anxiety amongst
the peninsula's residents, but also negatively affects public opinion about how the deoccupation of Crimea in the mainland part of Ukraine is prioritised.
‘Because what Russia is trying to promote and what,
unfortunately, is perceived by a significant part of the
Ukrainian population is that there are collaborators and
traitors in Crimea. This is a multidimensional situation,
where, for example, amongst the residents of Ukraine, it can
be manifested in such a way that we do not need this Crimea,
let's not return it, there are only collaborators, only bad
people there, we have lived without it and we will continue
to somehow live without it.’ (expert interview)
4.4.2 Is it collaboration if a Crimean resident receives a Russian passport?
Most Ukrainians agree that Crimean residents who received Russian passports
during the occupation had no choice and were forced to do so: 68% of respondents
believe so, whilst a significant share (29%) disagrees with this interpretation.
87
4.4.3. Who should be punished for collaboration in Crimea
Both experts and ordinary citizens in the qualitative research often emphasised
the importance of determining whether collaboration was political and voluntary or, on
the contrary, forced. That is, whether a person consciously participated in politics and
the implementation of ideological projects, or only performed the functions of a
firefighter, maths teacher, etc.
‘The level of teachers, educators, or something else,
is not even discussed; I did not notice any negative attitude.
But if, a teacher helps the occupation administration
to promote narratives amongst children, they push for the
Russian tricolour flag and everything else, without even
trying to mitigate it, they will be perceived negatively, and
their students’ parents will even discuss the teacher
between themselves. I witnessed this even when I still had
access to visit Crimea myself.’ (expert interview)
‘But again, I would prioritise what kind of
collaboration it is. Is it collaboration related to maintaining
the work of critical infrastructure facilities that help support
this government? Or is it collaboration that relates to the
fact that a person just goes to their job, one that is not
related to supporting and strengthening the occupation
authorities? Does this person work in law enforcement or
military recruitment? Or do they work, for example, in the
education system? Here, we must also distinguish between
what they do in the education system and what they teach.
If a person teaches Russian history and says that Ukraine is
a colony, then questions arise. If she teaches maths or
English and has no ideological influence on the child, I
would also rank it and say that it will be perceived as just an
element of survival in life today.’ (expert interview)
It is worth noting that, according to experts, collaborationism in education is
extremely complex and controversial. Educators' work fulfils an important social
function but has a significant ideological component.
‘And a separate subgroup in this group of state
employees is, of course, educators. People who work
according to Russian standards. People who are involved in
the militarisation of children. People who are engaged in
propaganda activities, and, I'm sorry, but that is the only
kind of education that exists in Russia. And this will be a big
question. We don’t need think about what to do with their
consciousness, but what to do about them at all. We need to
88
We need to cleanse these cadres, think about what this
process should be like, how tough and “total” it should be,
and so on. This is a separate topic altogether.’ (expert
interview)
In the focus group of Crimean Tatars, the following argument was made about
teachers working in the educational system of Crimea after occupation: whether they
received livelihoods from Ukrainian authorities that would allow them to obtain a certain
income.
‘There is a lot of serious work that needs to be done
to identify this level of collaboration in Crimea, but also
taking into consideration how the Ukrainian government left
Crimea. For example, in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, teachers still
receive some kind of salary so that they don't go, well,
people have to live on something, so that teachers don't go
to work in the occupied school of the occupying power. In
Crimea, Ukraine immediately refused to provide any
funding. All the people who worked in the state system and
who worked in public utilities were left without means of
subsistence. All these things should be considered, not only
the fact that a person was working, but the question was
what options he had in this situation if the state did not take
any steps.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
Crimean Tatars also pointed out that the reckless and ill-considered
communication of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the responsibility of people who
work in education in Crimea is wrong and harmful.
‘I don't remember exactly when, but it was probably
last year when our minister for the occupied territories said
that all teachers would be punished. And in Crimea, this
caused a lot of fear because many people worked at schools,
and they did not teach lessons on how to love Russia. This is
incorrect communication.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
92-94% of respondents to the quantitative survey demanded punishment for top
officials, ‘all the officials’ working in government bodies, and judicial and law
enforcement officials, for cooperation with the occupier administrations in Crimea.
Regarding people working in media, a majority (78%) also support punishment. At the
same time, only 35% of respondents support punishment for emergency service
workers (62% do not support punishment), and 25% support punishment for public
utility workers (72% do not support punishment). In the field of education and culture,
on the one hand, the majority of respondents support punishment for everyone,
although at a lesser extent than in the case of government officials. On the other hand,
89
they particularly expect punishment for principals, rectors, etc. (70%) and those who
taught humanities (66.5%). At the same time, 58-59% want to punish ‘ordinary’
education and culture workers (37% do not support punishment). As for entrepreneurs,
the level of punishment depends on the size of the enterprise. In the case of business
leaders, 50.5% support punishment, and 44% oppose it. As for small and mediumsized businesses, 58% believe they should not be punished, whilst 37% support
punishment. Regarding the healthcare sector, even in the case of executives, 57%
oppose punishment, whilst 18% support it. At the same time, in the case of ordinary
healthcare workers, 79% do not support punishment, whilst only 18% believe they
should be punished.
90
91
4.5. Educational Reintegration
4.5.1. Relevance of the education issue
In both qualitative and quantitative research, different segments of respondents,
experts, and ordinary citizens mentioned the importance of education for the
successful de-occupation of the peninsula.
Furthermore, focus group participants emphasised the critical importance of
education for the successful reintegration of Crimea.
‘...we need to set our hopes on education, right on
education. Because as the experience of developed
countries shows, education is a critical part of, as I said
earlier, soft power, that will allow us to grow a loyal society
for ourselves in the future.’ (focus group with residents of
Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
‘...I sincerely believe that any changes in reintegration
and reforms, if we are talking about people's
consciousness, begin from a very young age. That is, by
making changes, for example, in children’s education in
kindergartens, schools, and so on, you can start to educate
the very generation that will see Crimea as a part of Ukraine
and not otherwise... It is necessary to start changing the
mentality while it is being formed.’ (focus group with
residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
Respondents to the quantitative survey also demonstrated the importance of
education as a tool for reintegrating Crimea and their support for its usage. Most
respondents (66%) agree that admission to higher education institutions in other
regions of Ukraine should be simplified for young people from Crimea. At the same
time, one-third of respondents (32%) oppose this idea.
Education news have a prominent place in Crimean Telegram channels. The
analysis of these channels, conducted as part of the study, shows that more than a
fifth of all messages in the second phase of the study (when specific topics identified
by the researchers were monitored) were devoted to education - 22.2%. For
comparison, the subject of memorialisation was mentioned in 8% of the messages,
and the topic of the people of Crimea - about 3%. Along with organisational issues of
education (a certification system, reduction of the number of tests and homework, etc.),
these channels actively cover the ideological innovations that have been implemented
by the occupation administration. These include meetings between schoolchildren with
the military, teachers going to schools to teach ‘the basics of security and defence of
the Motherland’, and the possible introduction of lessons on ‘traditional values’.
92
4.5.2. Ideological influence of the educational process after the
occupation
Experts believe that the occupation administration's actions in the field of
education in Crimea have created one of the most serious problems that will have to
be solved in the process of de-occupation and the reintegration of Crimean residents
into Ukrainian society. Experts point out that the ideologisation and militarisation of
education in Crimea create entire age cohorts of students who may have a negative
attitude towards Ukraine.
‘Because, as far as I know, the Russians have already
developed a new education strategy, which is being actively
implemented in educational institutions for both youth and
children. This is both pioneering 2.0, and “conversations
about important things” when they say that Ukraine is a
fascist state, that Ukraine has forgotten about them, that no
one needs them, that Russia is here forever, and that
Ukraine will not return. And when you repeat this from year
to year, from lesson to lesson, you realise that it still affects
the subconscious. Therefore, there is a distorted perception
of the history of Ukraine, and, in my opinion, we will simply
have to revise the historical studies that currently exist,
create completely new material, for example, based on the
research by Yaroslav Hrytsak or Serhii Plokhy, and make
some kind of alternative history using the experience of the
Russian-Ukrainian war. This is the second way that we can
influence this. The third I have already mentioned, it is the
militarisation of education when war is perceived as a
normal part of life. Here, too, the Russians use their
"Dostoyevskys”, particularly Dostoevsky himself, and his
idea that war is a normal part of the struggle for the state's
space. They are very loyal to this concept and beautifully
write it into the education system. And we will also have to
fight with this. The third story is that they distort the concept
of patriotism. You understand that now we are talking about
Russian patriotism.’ (expert interview)
Related to the indoctrination of the educational process is the problem of
acceptance and recognition of Russian educational documents, a topic which was
raised by one of the participants in the expert study: what should be done with the
certificate of a student who started their studies after 2014 and successfully graduated
from school? What subjects can the Ukrainian state recognise, and what subjects can
it not recognise?
93
‘About the nostrification process, I'm talking about
the legislative approval of Russian educational documents.
Some subjects, for example, mathematics, may converge
with the Ukrainian programme. But as for the history of
Ukraine, there is also... Well, it's kind of there, but...’ (expert
interview)
4.5.3. Cultural Diffusion and Blurring of Identity in Crimean Education
In addition to the state's deliberate and purposeful direct ideological influence
on schoolchildren, respondents to the focus group with young Crimean Tatars also
pointed to a less visible but significant mechanism of blurring identities other than the
Russian one that operates in Crimean education. According to them, even Crimean
Tatar students studying in mixed schools adopt the majority culture and lose their
cultural characteristics.
‘Well, negatively, of course, because it's also about the
blurring of identity and the fact that there are people who are,
unfortunately, from younger generations than I. I don't know.
I don't know, when I see that even my cousins put music on
their stories and videos, I don’t know who they are. Who are
they at all? I can't ask you that, purely for security reasons.
But I understand that we have a different cultural field. And
they put on music by Russian musicians because they listen
to them, because in principle, they have no other, I don’t
know, alternatives. And forget about seeing anything
Crimean Tatar there.
If children study in some rural school in the
Simferopol district and it is not a Crimean Tatar school, then
they will grow up with the same children. Unfortunately, my
teenagers are cousins; they don't know the Crimean Tatar
[language] very well, and I don't think they associate
themselves with it much, even though they still live in
Crimea. However, as Respondent 4 said, their whole life was
spent in a Crimean school. That is, they have never left and
already managed to graduate last year.’ (focus groups with
Crimean Tatars)
4.5.4. Language issue in education in Crimea
According to experts, the language issue in the educational process may
become painful. Quotas for teaching certain subjects in indigenous and minority
languages can resolve this. However, this does not apply to the issue of the Russian
language in education in Crimea, which cannot be solved by such tools.
94
‘That is, we can talk about the introduction of
appropriate quotas. Quotas for education in the appropriate
language, for example. If you recall, Crimea had Jewish
communities and Armenian communities, not just the
Crimean Tatar community. We can talk about proportionality
in the education system depending on the proportion of the
population there.’ (expert interview)
‘Well, first of all, we have a very flexible and good
system that was developed as part of the decentralisation
reform, a system for the educational rights of minorities.
Here, the question will be, what should we do with the
Russian language, which is not covered by this? The fact
that the Ukrainian education system should be returned is
one thing. Still, we will need thoughtful policies, tactics and
mechanisms to overcome the language segregation of these
children. Perhaps, at certain stages, these will be bilingual
teaching methods at schools. There should also be the
return of education in the Crimean Tatar language, which is
also very important. The issue of the Greek minority, I know,
who also have a tiny population in Crimea now, we have to
study possibilities and needs and restore these educational
rights as well.’ (expert interview)
Some experts emphasise that, in their opinion, there should be no Russianlanguage schools in Crimea.
‘There should be two state languages in Crimea -
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar. There are languages of
national communities and dependencies, and obviously, it
should be possible for these languages to be taught in
Crimea. But this does not mean that this is about Russianlanguage schools. This vicious practice obviously cannot
be continued. If a person wants to learn something, they can
learn their native language, Bulgarian, Greek, Polish. And
the Ukrainian state should make such a decision on the
language whilst taking into account ethnic perspectives.’
(expert interview)
At the same time, when asked about the temporary use of Russian for teaching
in educational institutions, in 53.5% of cases, the residents of the mainland part of
Ukraine in the quantitative survey did not support such an initiative. However, a fairly
significant number of respondents (45%) expressed support. Amongst Ukrainianspeaking Ukrainians, opponents of the temporary usage significantly prevail (although
there are also quite a few who agree), and amongst bilingual and Russian-speaking
Ukrainians, the majority support the temporary usage.
95
4.5.5. Personnel issues in education after de-occupation
Regarding the staffing of the educational process in Crimea after the deoccupation, only 22% of respondents insist on the complete replacement of all
teachers, heads of institutions, education officials, etc. 34% instead propose to dismiss
only heads of institutions and officials (if they have not committed crimes), and 40%
consider it necessary to limit the dismissal to education officials.
4.6. Other components of reintegration
4.6.1. Demographic and statistical accounting of the existing population
of Crimea after de-occupation
In an expert interview, the speaker expressed their opinion that immediately
after de-occupation, Ukraine should create a system of accounting and documentation
of the existing population of Crimea since, according to international humanitarian law,
Ukraine will be responsible for these people.
‘If we have built the infrastructure for interaction
with the population - and the population is the main thing -
then we need to first and foremost address the issue of
documenting the population. This is important because I
have already said that more than a million people, a third of
the current population, were imported to Crimea from
somewhere else. And we, as the state of Ukraine, as a state
that adheres to international humanitarian law, we will have
to take care of the entire population on the territory we
receive.’ (expert interview)
‘I am sure that in the last 10 years, there were many
Russians who came illegally and have already acquired or
have their own property. Illegally acquired property. What do
we do with them? But in a year, all of them, at once…they
won't leave all at once, they won't just leave everything they
have there. And this raises the question: what should we
do? That is why we propose, first of all, to register everyone
who is actually located on the territory of Crimea.’ (expert
interview)
4.6.2. Keeping the Crimean issue in the mainland part of Ukraine current
Some experts believe that not enough efforts are being made to keep the issue
of de-occupation of Crimea on the agenda of Ukrainian citizens. The expert's logic is
that, in addition to developing strategies and preparatory work for the de-occupation of
96
Crimea, constant day-to-day work should demonstrate the cultural and political unity
of the ‘host country’ and Crimea.
‘We need to work first with the host country, and,
unfortunately, we are building some kind of castles for
future return and reintegration. And at the same time, we are
not working with the host country. We aren’t working... How
many exhibitions of Crimean artists have you seen? Doesn't
the Ukrainian population have any paintings by Crimean
artists? There are so many events that are happening here
and now. To keep in the consciousness of Ukrainians that
Crimea is Ukraine.’ (expert interview)
According to experts, the issue of Crimea must be made current in Ukrainian
school education by increasing attention to it quantitatively and by making efforts to
form the right ideological ‘framework’ for Ukrainian students regarding the deoccupation of the peninsula.
‘For example, we are now seeing that the Russians are
preparing a new textbook for schools, in which they have
Crimea is not a separate region, but part of the all-Russian
narrative. We understand that a certain generation of
children, people, and young adults will grow up with this
textbook and have this outlook on the situation with Crimea.
This is where Ukraine needs to look at and develop counternarratives and put them not just in textbooks. We need to
prepare these textbooks, these methodological materials
and everything else, and this is what we need to offer in
Ukraine now. Because if you look at a textbook, for example,
on the history of Ukraine, there is very little about Crimea.
There are two or three that are very general and in which,
excuse me, the Cossacks fought with the Crimean Tatars
there almost constantly. This wasn’t actually the case, but
we still don’t have these materials. This is the so-called
preparatory situation that exists today. That is, we need to
prepare the population of the controlled part of Ukraine to
understand that Crimea is the territory of Ukraine and that
not only collaborators and traitors live there, which is what
Russia is trying to put into the information space of Ukraine.’
(expert interview)
97
4.6.3. Communication of the reintegration plan to the population of
Crimea
One expert emphasised that the reintegration plan for Crimea should not only
be elaborated in detail by the Ukrainian authorities, but also be communicated and
explained to the Crimean residents. Otherwise, the absence of such information will
generate distrust and fear amongst Crimeans.
‘And the main thing is communicating now how it
should happen. Because for the people who live in
ignorance, their ignorance breeds distrust. This is an
important aspect. If we don't communicate this, it can be like
a black box for people from which they can expect bad
decisions for themselves. In general, if you look at postSoviet societies, any changes are often perceived as
something bad for post-Soviet societies.’ (expert interview)
4.7. Challenges that Ukrainian society may face after the deoccupation of Crimea
Here is a list of possible challenges that Ukrainian society may face after the deoccupation of Crimea.
4.7.1. Possible conflict over the status of Crimea and the issue of
national-territorial autonomy of Crimean Tatars
Some experts who participated in the study believe that a political conflict over
the political life and governance model in Crimea could become a severe problem for
Ukraine after de-occupation.
‘In Ukraine, the main conflict that can and already does
have some of these features is the conflict over what Crimea
will be like. That is, what will it be? What status and
organisational model will Crimea be, an oblast or nationalterritorial autonomy, or as it was before? There are at least
three options whose supporters can communicate with each
other in a very conflicting way. At the level of Ukraine, there
is, if not one hundred per cent, then a very high probability
of conflict, which will occur if we do not start working on this.
Work is being done, I know, there are steps, but we need a
clearer position and concrete decisions from those who
make decisions today, i.e. from the leaders of state decisions
and so on.’ (expert interview)
98
‘Well, of course, the first thing that comes to my mind
is the expectations and interests of indigenous peoples and
the largest, most numerous indigenous people to find and
restore their home in the form of autonomy, which is not
perceived as a positive development by all groups in
Ukraine, moreover, because of the full-scale invasion due to
the war that has been going on there for ten years, there are
many concerns about the form that the Crimeans have
chosen for themselves about autonomy. And this is the first
source of potential conflict.’ (expert interview)
‘The third small potential conflict I see is between
representatives of the Ukrainian community in Crimea and
Crimean Tatars. It is already somewhere in the atmosphere;
it can sometimes be felt, to be honest. It can also happen
because they have their ambitions and claims, and lack of
attention to their expectations, wishes and interests, in their
opinion.’ (expert interview)
This risk was also voiced in a focus group with young Crimean Tatars. According
to one of the respondents, Crimean Tatar autonomy does not have much support in
Ukrainian politics and society, which could lead to a conflict between its people and the
Ukrainian authorities after de-occupation.
‘Firstly, we will need at least five years in Crimea if there
is de-occupation, and that’s only if we have a positive
perspective. There will be a military administration in
Crimea, where the issue of Crimean Tatar autonomy will not
be considered at all.
I hope we will win this war. Then, I believe, we will have
to continue to fight with the Ukrainian authorities for
Crimean Tatar national-territorial autonomy to realise our
right as the Indigenous people of Crimea to selfdetermination. We are talking about national-territorial
autonomy within Ukraine. Today, this issue does not receive
support from Ukrainian politicians or many Ukrainian
citizens.
However, everyone seems to understand that we have
the right to do so. Unfortunately, over 50% of the population
of Ukraine is still waking up, or these thoughts are
contagious. I don't know, there are some kinds of
imperialistic sentiments towards the Crimean Tatars of
Crimea. Therefore, we will still have to fight for Crimean Tatar
autonomy and our right to self-determination and existence.’
(focus groups with Crimean Tatars)
99
4.7.2. Possible social and political conflict between Ukrainian citizens
inside Crimea
During the expert interviews, it was suggested that the long-standing
contradictions between Crimean residents who remained loyal to Ukraine and those
who supported the occupation could escalate into an open conflict after de-occupation.
‘As for Crimea, first of all, this is a question of, you
know, being ready for a certain revision. I don't want to do it,
but there may be revenge. The revenge of those who have
remained committed to Ukraine all those years under
oppression, and those who openly supported the
occupation. This is the kind of almost physical conflict that
can break out. I have talked to people who are ready on an
individual psychological level to use even physical force to
take revenge on those who personally did something bad to
them, to others, perhaps their friends, or just to someone
they consider to be a victim of the occupation. And at the
level of Crimea, this can be a powerful and serious conflict.’
(expert interview)
Crimean Tatars who are now living in the mainland part of Ukraine are also
concerned about this. When discussing the de-occupation and reintegration of Crimean
residents into Ukrainian society, respondents noted a potential challenge related to the
sentiments of the population that supports Russia.
‘I see a complicated future. If there is de-occupation
[when – Ed.], it will be joyful, but it will be challenging
because most of the population there is Russia-orientated.
For example, Russians who are already used to living in
Russia will stay there. And somehow, you will have to live
with them because you can't sentence them all. They won't
all leave. And these conflicts will be constant, so we need to
take a tough position there. And I'm just apprehensive about
how there may be a lot of problems with these people later,
that these same people will not allow us to live normally in
Crimea. Because they will again somehow make Crimea a
separate part of Ukraine.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
Experts say that Ukraine should already develop a reconciliation policy that will
be implemented after de-occupation.
‘And so, the state must also have answers to such
claims, and prevent conflicts from escalating from such
individual clashes, which will 100% be a result of some kind
of social tension. I'm saying it will happen individually, it will
100
happen for years, unfortunately, but the state must carefully
think up a policy of reconciliation. We have already talked
about this, and a lot needs to be done, many specific details
need to be looked at carefully.’ (expert interview)
4.7.3. Possible conflict between citizens of the Russian Federation who
illegally settled in Crimea after 2014 and Ukrainian society
Both participants in the focus group discussions and experts discuss the
possibility of a conflict between Ukrainian society and Russian citizens who settled in
Crimea. The focus group participants talk about difficult ‘forks in the road’ for the
Ukrainian authorities: how should these people be deported from Crimea? What should
be the policy regarding the property they acquired in Crimea after 2014? Experts say
that this group of Russians may have material incentives to stay in Crimea, and there
is a risk of creating a politically encapsulated community. In addition, any radical actions
by the Ukrainian authorities against this group of Russian citizens could be interpreted
as a violation of international law.
‘Because for these ten years, for example, a large part
of the population that came from Russia, what will happen to
them? Do we have to deport them? For example, if there is a
very positive outcome and Crimea is de-occupied, what
should we do with the population that came from Russia?
What if, for example, they were living in flats that belonged
to Ukrainians who left Crimea? There are a lot of questions,
both about language issues and, in general, what to do with
the population there. I think we will have a lot of problems if
we de-occupy Crimea, and, to be honest, I still don't know
the official position of our government. I remember there
were some news reports on how to solve some problems,
but I don't see a clear position or a vision of this.’ (focus
group with residents of Ukraine who are not Crimean Tatars)
‘...if in Crimea, at the level of Crimea, if there are many
people who came from the Russian Federation after 2014,
and not all of them can leave or do not want to leave and will
try their best, some of them, to gain a foothold, as it
happened in Estonia, then of course, there is potential for
conflict between these groups. They will want access to all
the benefits that Ukraine will have as part of the European
body and will not want to return. But at the same time, they
will not want to become part of the nation-building
processes and part of Ukraine in general. People are
definitely aware about this.’ (expert interview)
101
‘I have already said that some of the population that
moved to Crimea will try to stay. Even though they are
violators of Ukrainian law, Ukraine will have to build certain
algorithms to comply with international humanitarian law.
Yes, Ukraine can deviate from certain norms, but it cannot
ignore international law in general, so there will be conflicts
here. There are families there, families have even had
children who were born and have grown up, and this will be
a conflict zone, a vast conflict zone.’ (expert interview)
Another aspect of this problem is the legal resolution of the issue of property,
primarily real estate, that appeared in Crimea after the occupation. Experts say that
certain infrastructure facilities or residential real estate built after 2014 are illegal under
Ukrainian law. At the same time, Crimean residents and businesses use these
facilities, which may become another source of conflict.
4.7.4. Possible conflict between Crimean residents and government
officials from other regions of Ukraine
The expert study suggested that after de-occupation, Crimea will need many
professional managers, civil servants, etc., who are likely to be deployed from other
regions of Ukraine. Crimean residents may perceive this as ‘quasi-colonisation.’
‘You know where I see inter-regional conflict at the
level between regions? I see it in how there will be a lack of
personnel to administer and manage the liberated
territories, including Crimea. And of course, many people
will want to go to the South, where there is a lot of sun. There
may be a conflict there, a conflict between different regions
because, as I said, many Crimeans will perceive this as
quasi-colonisation. [...] Well, what I said before, between
regions, is true. I also see that if, conditionally, the
apparatus and representatives of the state leave en masse,
this will also be the basis for potential conflicts or rejection
of these people in Crimea.’ (expert interview)
4.7.5. Possible tension on the issue of confessions
Experts discussed this danger in the interviews. According to one respondent,
most Crimean residents who consider themselves Orthodox were parishioners of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, now the Russian Orthodox
Church, and after de-occupation, this issue could become a conflict on the peninsula.
102
‘Well, the situation with the church is very important.
I mean, here’s the church, if it will be easier regarding Islam,
in my opinion, and it will also be easier for other faiths, but
as for Orthodox Christians, there will be a problem. 99% of
them were parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
of the Moscow Patriarchate at that time, and now the
Russian Orthodox Church. And it will be impossible to
change this. We will have to think about all this.’ (expert
interview)
4.7.6. Possible tension in the language issue
Although experts mainly mention the potential conflict around the church issue,
Ukrainian respondents and experts also point out the danger of a conflict related to
regulating the language sphere after de-occupation. In their opinion, rapid and
comprehensive Ukrainisation could provoke a confrontation after the de-occupation of
Crimea.
‘I think the first thing will be the language. Well, I don't
know, that’s what I think for some reason. If they start very
strongly, as we heard at the beginning of the 22nd, that you,
you Muscovites, you are like this, you’re all these types of
things, you speak Russian there, you were waiting for them,
you were asking them to come, up until now you haven’t left
Kharkiv while it’s being bombed, you just sit there only
because you’re waiting for them. But it’s not 100% like that,
we aren’t waiting for anyone, naturally. And if we bend the
rules too far, they will start to cross the line and adopt very
serious laws. I think it will be difficult. They will resist... We
must get along somehow. Calmly, gently. No one is
harassing anyone. It's up to you how you want to speak.
There are official documents there; everything is in
Ukrainian. It is part of Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea. I don't think ordinary people should be bent over
backwards and reproached for this. It should be done
calmly.’ group with residents of Ukraine who are not
Crimean Tatars)
‘...contradictions can arise. I can only think of the
topic of language, that is, Ukrainian/Russian. We have been
actively carrying out Ukrainisation for the last ten years.
Crimea fell away at that time when it all started. That's it.
Well, how do you solve it? Just teach it at schools and
universities. Soft Ukrainisation.’ (focus group with nonCrimean Tatar residents of Ukraine)
103
‘We have a lot of such statements that we will only
have things in Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and other
languages. There will be no Russian. In fact, in my heart, I
think this is the wrong thing to do. It would be wrong. We
will still need to keep the Russian language. Another
question is what we will need to do...’ (expert interview)
‘In particular, a crucial, very sensitive issue is the use
of the Ukrainian language in Crimea. Here, we need to
understand the overall strategy and tactics. The general
strategy is that Crimea is Ukraine, and the Ukrainian
language should be used on Crimea's territory at all levels.
However, tactically, we must understand that Ukrainian has
not been spoken there for more than ten years. And there
will be no immediate perception of information in Ukrainian.
We will have to convey socially important and politically
important information to the residents of Crimea, and we will
have to convey it in the language they understand then.
First, we need to use more of the language for such
information, for general things, and to create more
opportunities for learning the Ukrainian language. In this
way. It should be the so-called “Soft Ukrainisation”, not as
radical as, unfortunately, we sometimes have here, where
we’re out there, hot under the collar, and let's translate
everything into Ukrainian at once.’ (expert interview)
The issue of language in Crimea after the de-occupation is a kind of litmus test
that shows that different experts, territorial groups of the population, and ethnic groups
have different ideas about how it will be organised. This indicates the lack of a
developed conceptual framework for organising life after de-occupation and, secondly
(and as a corollary to the first), the lack of communication of these concepts.
The quantitative survey results confirm that most residents of the mainland part
of Ukraine understand the complexity and danger of the language issue in Crimea and
mainly support the gradual Ukrainisation of life on the peninsula. Most respondents
(67-76%) believe a transitional period should be established in Crimea to introduce the
Ukrainian language in certain institutions, including government, educational and
cultural institutions, media, and services. 22-31% of respondents do not support this
opinion. The highest level of support recorded was for introducing a transitional period
in government and education (76% supporting, and 22% not supporting), whilst the
lowest was in the media (67% supporting and 31% not supporting). At the same time,
respondents believe that the transition period should not be long. When asked how
long the transition period should last for introducing the Ukrainian language in Crimea,
only 20% of respondents said that it was not needed at all. The majority favours a
short-term period: 35% believe it should last up to 1 year, and 24% - up to 3 years.
104
One of the experts offered his concept of the Ukrainisation of Crimea after deoccupation: the Ukrainian language should be associated with universal and
acceptable values for most people.
‘And when we talk about Ukrainisation again, we need
to demonstrate more Ukrainisation. This is not an
imposition of the Ukrainian language, traditions, etc. This is
a value-based approach. Values. Freedom, human rights,
the right to protect Indigenous people, the right for them to
develop, the right to choose, the right to freely travel to other
countries, etc. And respect for the state, respect and
responsibility to the state, and respect for the state language
should be mandatory in Crimea.’ (expert interview)
As for support for the Crimean Tatar language, 84% believe it needs the state's
support. 12% do not think so (4% have no opinion).
105
106
5. Memory
5.1. Attitudes towards monuments and memorials erected
during the Russian occupation of Crimea
Only 5% of respondents to the quantitative survey believe that monuments and
sights in Crimea erected during the occupation should be left in place. Instead, 52%
are in favour of simply demolishing them. One option that could be a compromise -
creating a special commission - is supported by 36%.
The results of the qualitative research provide a more detailed picture of this
problem and experts' ideas on the best way to solve it.
5.1.1. Division of monuments into groups: historically significant and
propaganda
The research participants believe it is essential to distinguish between
monuments that have historical value for the region and those that are exclusively
colonial and propagandistic. Monuments associated with historical figures who have
positively contributed to the development of Crimea, such as the monument to architect
Nikolai Krasnov in Yalta, can be preserved. Monuments of historical or cultural
significance to the Crimean Tatar people, such as the memorial to the deportation of
Crimean Tatars, may also be preserved. But other monuments associated with
Russian colonisers, such as the monument to Catherine the Great or those glorifying
the war against Ukraine, should be dismantled.
‘In this case, I would suggest that all the monuments
that were erected during the occupation period and are
related to the occupation, to its capture and so on, should
be demolished on the first day and destroyed.’ (focus group
with Crimean Tatars)
‘Oh, this is a difficult question. Why? Because you
can't tar everyone with the same brush, as they say. Let's
remember what monuments have been erected there. There
is a monument, for example, for the deportation of the
Crimean Tatars, which is in the Bakhchysarai district at the
station of Syren. There is a monument, for example, to AmetKhan Sultan, two-time Hero of the Soviet Union, who
represents the Crimean Tatar people. But there is also a
monument, for example, to Catherine the Great, who is the
executioner of both the Ukrainian people and the Crimean
Tatar people. Therefore, it is complicated to talk about every
monument this way. There is also a separate and long
107
question involving nuances. I will say this: any monuments
that are associated with the glorification of this so-called
situation with the SMO, should be dismantled. They should
disappear from the memorial space of Ukraine as such.’
(expert interview)
Other experts suggest using such monuments for historical education, adding
the necessary context and explanations from experts.
‘Well, for example, look. During the years of
occupation, a whole memorial complex for the victims of
deportation and so on appeared near Bakhchysarai, in the
village of Syren, a museum town. There is also a monument
there with figures of people who were deported, of people
with knots who are somehow going somewhere. But there is
no depiction of the soldiers who deported them. The
memorial does not show who did it. We should explain and
show people that Russia tried to distort this history,
particularly the deportations. We should explain why this
monument should not be used, why tour guides should say,
look, actually, things really happened a certain way, the
reality of certain events, but Russia tried to show it
differently. And to draw the attention of young people, or
whoever will come there, old people, foreigners, to come
and clearly show how the Russian Federation, and the
Soviet Union before it, tried to do all this, to disguise history.
And not by hand, but by these monuments. I think this can
be used in a very cool way.’ (expert interview)
Some experts believe that the fate of monuments erected after 2014 which are
not political should be decided by local Crimean communities; otherwise, this issue
could become another point of conflict after the peninsula's de-occupation.
‘There are monument-markers of the Russian
Federation erected after the annexation [occupation – Ed.].
For example, there is the monument to Alexander III near the
Livadia Palace and other monuments. These are markers
that need to be destroyed. Well, because these monuments
are not very connected with the region, they will not directly
cause such resistance from the local population. And there
are monuments, for example, that you will need to consider.
However, they are markers, too, marking the territory not
related to political figures like Alexander III, whom I just
mentioned. For example, for the city where I was born, for
the city of Yalta, the architect Nikolay Krasnov, a Nobel Prize
winner in architecture, was a significant figure for the locals.
108
And not during the Soviet Union, not during Ukraine, [before
both of them]. He was the person who formed the modern
register of Yalta [as its Chief Architect]. But Yalta, the way it
was built, the way the pier was made, he was very much
respected by the locals. The Russians came and erected a
monument to Krasnov. For me, the question is, what we will
do with the monument to Krasnov because, once again,
none of the locals will cry about Alexander III. They will
demolish it, demolish it. But there will be outrage over the
monument to Krasnov, for example, the monument to
Chekhov and the monument to Mikhail Pugovkin, which
have appeared as part of the city's landscape. For example,
there’s the monument to Aleksandr Khanzhonkov, a
Ukrainian filmmaker, the founder of Ukrainian cinema. But
this monument was erected by Russians. How do we deal
with these monuments? Again, we come back to the
principles I mentioned. It requires participation. If it's a
political figure, then we just demolish it. If it is not a political
figure, then I think it is necessary to discuss these
monuments and their future fate publicly.’ (expert interview)
An example of the great conflict potential of decisions, which involve
demolishing monuments without consulting the community, can be seen in Crimean
Telegram channels:
‘This post informs about the decision to dismantle the
monument to Viktor Tsoi and the band “Kino” near Sudak,
which caused a negative reaction amongst the audience. In
the context of memorialisation, many people have expressed
outrage over the destruction of an important cultural symbol,
considering this a manifestation of disrespect for the
legendary musician's legacy. The negative feedback
underscores the importance of preserving historical and
cultural sites, especially those important to the community.’
109
Telegram channel ‘Emergency Crimea’
Caption: Near Sudak, a monument to Tsoi and the group ‘Kino’ (at the place
where everything began) will be removed to make way for a bypass road.
As far as we can tell, the community's occupier leadership has decided not to
dismantle the monument.
The conclusions of the content analysis of Telegram channels emphasise the
importance of monuments for Crimean residents.
‘It is important to emphasise that one of the critical
topics that evokes a significant emotional response is the
preservation of historical monuments on the peninsula. This
topic is significant because of the rich cultural heritage of
Crimea, which includes ancient ruins, medieval fortresses,
and religious sites from different eras.
Telegram channels are becoming essential platforms
for popularising the idea of protecting these historical
monuments. Active coverage of these topics by the channels
indicates the local population's and community's deep
interest in preserving the region's cultural identity. In
addition, it also raises the question of the impact of current
political and social changes on the state of these sites,
110
causing an emotional resonance amongst readers.’ (content
analysis of Telegram channels)
5.1.2. Museum of the Occupation
Some focus group respondents and experts suggest not destroying all the
monuments, but removing and placing them in an occupation museum, where they
could serve as a reminder of Russia's aggression and have an educational function for
future generations.
‘...in the practice of some future, it may be necessary
to dismantle the monument of Alexander Suvorov, but not
to completely demolish it and destroy it, like the monuments
of Lenin and Stalin, who are criminals, but to move them to
some other place, which could be, for example, a park or a
museum, an open park, in my opinion.’ (focus group with
non-Crimean Tatar residents of Ukraine)
5.1.3. Local community decisions vs mandatory implementation of the
current laws of Ukraine
Non-Crimean Tatar focus group participants believe that it is important to
conduct an information campaign aimed at raising awareness amongst Crimean
residents about Russia's negative role in the history of Crimea, the true history.
According to some participants, such a campaign could catalyse the destruction of
monuments erected by Russia on Crimean residents' initiative. This, in turn, would be
better perceived by the Crimeans themselves, as a decision ‘from below’ rather than
one imposed by the authorities.
‘We must first show the actual history, teach people,
show them its quite different side, the one that wasn’t so
great. And so, when people realise that this is not something
to be proud of, they will destroy these sights and
monuments just like it happened here. That is, people went
out and destroyed monuments themselves, to Lenin, Stalin,
and the like. That is, it was an expression of the people's will.
So, we have to start with the people themselves. We need to
show them a different story so that people just come to this
themselves, and not that we arrived and we destroyed them
because we must.’ (focus group with residents of Ukraine
who are not Crimean Tatars)
111
Some experts also talk about the chain of information campaigns leading to
community decisions, pointing out that these should not be the decisions of the local
government, but of the entire community:
‘Well, of course, I would like to say that we need to
destroy them, but I will say this: it should be decided by the
local community. This should not be the decision of local
governments, but rather be at the referendum level. If the
residents believe it should be there, I would like to hear an
argument about why it should be there. The local
government should offer an alternative, including what
should be there and why these monuments should not be in
Crimea. Before this referendum, there should be a welldeveloped information campaign against the preservation of
these monuments and their replacement with pro-Ukrainian
or pro-Ukrainian-Tatar monuments. And this will be much
more logical than preserving the relics of the Russian
occupation.’ (expert interview)
Other experts believe that all decisions regarding monuments should simply be
made based on the current laws of Ukraine:
‘I have said several times that Ukrainian law should
work there. It's very simple. Does this monument comply
with our legislation? No. So what do we have here? It was
erected, I don’t know, with the owner's consent, it was
erected on the territory of, let's say, a boarding house, and
a monument to Stalin, which was stolen in Ukraine, was
erected. Well, why should it be there? Why is there a
monument to Stalin near the Livadia Palace? Why should it
be there? No, why? Because we have a law.
Decommunisation, de-Stalinisation, or whatever else does
not comply with the law. There isn’t anything like this. It's
simple. The law should be the same for everyone. Then
people will perceive it normally. It will just be: we’re doing
this because of this law, and that’s it.’ (expert interview)
112
5.2. Attitudes towards place names
Russia has changed the name of Crimea several times throughout history. The
first instance occurred during the reign of Catherine II when active Russification
policies were enforced. The second time was under Stalin, when the names were
ideologically altered. Now, for the third time, we are seeing it again in the present day.
This illustrates the continuous layering of changes that Russia has imposed on Crimea
under different political regimes.
Experts from the group of Crimean Tatars have the most defined and
consolidated position regarding toponymic changes. They believe it is necessary to
return historical place names in Crimea (most of which will be of Crimean Tatar origin),
not limited to decommunisation. These experts point out that it would be unfair to
replace Soviet and Russian place names with predominantly Ukrainian ones. Some
other experts who are not Crimean Tatars agree with this proposal.
‘...well, right now, we must demonstrate Ukraine as a
fair state. So now we must return all the names of historical
places in Crimea. This is the first thing. Unfortunately, we
see different approaches and opinions amongst Ukrainians,
including experts. I would say, when they say that we need
to get rid of Russian narratives in toponomy, they mean that
we need more Ukrainian ones. But if we rename settlements
by something other than their historical names, it doesn't
matter what their origin is, whether Tatar or Greek or
something else. Artificially inventing Ukrainian names will
be perceived as colonisation. If I propose something like
this, we need to demonstrate that Ukraine is fair. That is, to
return all historical names.’ (expert interview)
‘Regarding the issues related to memorialisation, you
can say, perhaps, that this question involves
decolonisation, in particular the decolonisation of
geographical names, if we start talking about it. In my
understanding, this has to take place, and this means that
Ukrainian society will have to understand that these
historical names were changed after the first annexation of
Crimea by Catherine the Great during the Russian Empire
and then changed after the deportation of the Crimean
Tatars.
The return of historical names is precisely the return
of Ukrainian memory. This is not only the Crimean Tatar
memory or the memory of the Germans who lived in these
territories. This is the return of Ukrainian memory because
this is the history of Ukraine. This Ukrainian nation was
113
formed, I say, not only by ethnic Ukrainians, but also from
the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, as well as other nations
that participated in the formation of the Ukrainian nation.’
(expert interview)
Other experts point out that radical changes in place names could cause conflict
amongst Crimean residents, some of whom may not accept the disappearance of
essential names from the peninsula's map.
‘Will this be a trigger for interethnic conflict amongst
the rest of the non-Crimean Tatars? I don't know. It depends
on the policy under which this reintegration will take place.
It needs to be spelled out, you know, right down to the letter.
Well, I can tell you about the place names. Well, even now,
when Crimeans are considering these changes to Crimea’s
toponymy that Ukraine is proposing, they are outraged. I
don't know what will happen there. When Sevastopol, as a
name, will disappear. Or Simferopol as a name. I don't know
how it will be. Won't it trigger the deterioration of people’s
attitude towards Crimean Tatars?’ (expert interview)
In the focus groups, Crimean Tatars themselves mention the risks of radical
changes in the toponymic landscape, while noting that, in their view, this is a matter of
restoring historical justice. At the same time, they note that even the idea of total
completely renaming each city is already causing resistance amongst certain groups
of Crimeans.
‘I want to add. The question of decommunisation and
de-Russification is important in our country because this
process has hardly begun in Crimea, and there will be big
questions about returning historical names to Crimean
cities, primarily Sevastopol, Yevpatoriya, Simferopol, and
everything else. There may be some problems with the
acceptance of this because, for example, I have already seen
some Crimean people who have left Crimea, who aren’t
Crimean Tatars, who are against renaming things,
suggesting to let them stay as they are, to not rename them
to anything Crimean Tatar, because they are used to it and
everything else.
That is, double standards are being applied to the
implementation of this law. This may be a big problem
because many Crimean Tatars hope that historical names
will be returned. This is one of the cross-cutting themes in
restoring the rights of the Crimean Tatar people. It was there
114
before 2014; this discourse is still there, and, well, in
general, it will remain.’ (focus group with Crimean Tatars)
The respondents to the quantitative survey seem more inclined towards
compromise in this regard: more than half (55%) believe that after the de-occupation
of Crimea, new names for place names should be chosen that reflect the heritage of
all ethnic groups. At the same time, a minority supports the other two polarised
approaches: 20% of respondents believe that the historical Crimean Tatar names
should be restored, and only 19% favour leaving the names unchanged.
Participants in one of the focus groups with Ukrainian citizens also mentioned
that changing place names could become a point of conflict. Still, they justified this not
by ideological issues but by practical ones, such as the need to reissue documents
and so on.
‘After the de-occupation of Crimea, there may be
disputes over changing the names of settlements and
streets. Many people are already accustomed to the existing
names, and if there is a need to revise all the documents for
115
new names, it may cause many questions and conflicts.’
(focus group with non-Crimean Tatar residents of Ukraine)
Although most respondents agree with the need for renaming places, opinions
are divided on who should decide the new names in Crimea. Relatively most
respondents (33%) believe that the residents themselves should decide this through a
poll or public hearing. Another 20% agree that it should be through a poll or public
hearing, but believe that it should be decided by the Indigenous people of Ukraine, not
by the local residents. Fewer respondents chose the other options: 12% support
decision-making by state authorities, and 11% - by the official representative bodies of
Indigenous peoples of Ukraine. Interestingly, contrary to similar events in different
regions of Ukraine, only 5% of respondents believe that the military administration
should make the decision.
In the context of toponymy, respondents to the quantitative survey were also
asked about the pace of decommunisation in Crimea after the de-occupation. They
were asked whether there should be a transition period for replacing the names of
administrative-territorial units, other geographical objects, and legal entities in the
public sphere of the peninsula, if they contain symbols of the communist totalitarian
regime. Most respondents (63%) support a transition period being introduced for
decommunisation. At the same time, a significant part of the population (33%) opposes
this.
5.3. Attitudes towards war graves
Most experts believe that Ukraine should not dismantle cemeteries, but should
ensure that these sites remain places of remembrance for relatives without signs of
memorialisation or glorification of the war. Ukraine should avoid the presence of
military monuments and Russian symbols, particularly the letters Z and V. These
should exclusively be places of remembrance, not memorial complexes. Ukraine
should take international experience and standards into account. The deceased can
be recognised as victims of Russian aggression, especially in Crimea. It is crucial to
ensure that relatives have access to places of remembrance. Regarding the graves of
Russian soldiers, Ukraine can offer exhumation and transfer of the bodies to relatives
for reburial in Russia. Experts suggest this could be part of an agreement between
Ukraine and Russia, including exchanging bodies from both sides.
‘As for the burial of real people, this is a separate
situation, and a certain procedure needs to be followed. In
my opinion, what this procedure should include is that, for
example, in commemorative displays, i.e., the monument on
the grave of, for example, a Ukrainian citizen who died in the
116
SMO and fought on the side of Russia, cannot contain
elements that Ukraine is against, like the letter Z or
something else. So, these monuments will have to be
remade. But the grave itself cannot be, for example,
destroyed and everything else, because this is, I'm sorry, an
indecent situation.’ (expert interview)
‘There is already international experience here too.
Even the people who fought in the army are victims of
Russian expansion in the unprovoked Russian war. Of
course, these victims, especially the local populations
which were far from voluntarily mobilised, were forced to
mobilise. The memory of the victims of Russian aggression,
of Russian...’ (expert interview)
Crimean Tatar focus group participants also believe that nothing should be done
with the graves of Russian servicemen who died in battles with the AFU, as well as
with the graves of the Ukrainian citizens and Crimean residents who were mobilised
by the Russian occupation administration and died fighting the AFU, and who are
buried in Crimea.
‘I believe that nothing should be done with graves if it
is just a grave and there are no memorials on them that
would contradict our history, justice, and so on. If it says
that these people are the heroes of the SMO, then you can
simply ask to remove this monument. You can remove this
monument and leave the grave there. So that it will be just
an ordinary grave, and no one knows who is lying there. Just
someone's son, husband, sister, and so on. Getting rid of
the graves, well, the whole world would perceive that badly.’
(focus group with Crimean Tatars)
The opinions of most non-Crimean Tatar respondents regarding war graves
were also unequivocal, although the complexity of this issue was emphasised. Most of
the respondents said that Ukraine should not initiate the reburial of Russian
servicemen whose graves are in Crimea. However, our country should be allowed to
rebury Russian servicemen if the relatives of the victims, or Russia in general, wish to
exhume and transport the bodies to Russia. Some participants drew analogies to the
burials of German soldiers on the territory of Ukraine, as well as to the burials from
World War I and World War II in Europe. These examples were cited in the context of
the soldiers' graves being left untouched and cared for by local authorities,
emphasising the possibility of a similar approach to the graves of Russian servicemen.
117
Several participants noted that memorials should not be built for the fallen Russian
soldiers, but rather, that these places should be left unadorned and not attract
attention.
‘By no means can you do anything with the graves.
First, since we are moving towards Europe, we need to take
an example from Europe. Many graves and burials from the
First World War and the Second World War remain
untouched, and even the locals take care of them. So, this is
not even a debatable issue; it is a deeply ethical one...
History will remain history, but we still need to preserve the
rights of relatives, no matter whether it is those of the
occupation forces or ours. We need to preserve the right of
relatives to visit, first of all, the grave, and by no means
disturb the grave, without the relatives’ permission and
request.’ (focus group with residents of Ukraine who are not
Crimean Tatars)
Our contacts:

Назад

Залогинтесь, что бы оставить свой комментарий